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Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of
Coalitions and Costly Information
Richard S. Murphyt and Erin A. O'Haratt

This article analyzes Supreme Court and other federal court
cases, to explain the seemingly disparateincorporationof
mistake of law excuses into federal criminal statutes. Most
of the cases can be explained from an information cost perspective. If an easily separablesubset of the regulatedpopulation cannot be induced to learn their legal obligations
given credibly low priorprobabilitiesand high information
costs, they are excused from criminal liability.Moreover,
when criminalstatutes are vulnerable to constituentprotest,
courts require that enforcers increase awareness of the law
through information subsidies rather than convicting the
ignorant.At least with mistake of law, the federal courts
most often interpretfederal statutes to enhance both the
value and durabilityof legislative bargains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Law is useful only to the extent it is known. This is true from the
perspective of a regulator or lawmaker, who will view a legal rule
t Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
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as a message that enables behavior to be channeled: it is information of the form, "if you do X, or something that looks like X, Y
may happen to you." It is true also for the citizenry: a person deciding whether to act must make a prediction about the legal consequences of acting, and decide if the predicted legal sanction makes
it worthwhile to refrain from acting. Announced law-statutes,
judicial opinions, regulations, media stories about jury verdicts-is
a set of data that aids in this prediction.
As with other forms of information, law is not free. The cost of
acquiring it can be high, even infinite: a corporation may have to
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to determine if it is in compliance with tax laws, or securities laws, and it may never "know"
for certain. Or the cost can be relatively low: a driver in determining
whether his driving might cost him his license must make a small
investment in knowing the traffic laws. Everyone must spend time
ascertaining community moral standards that may be embodied in
criminal prohibitions. In any event, the cost is not zero, and the
investment in legal information is therefore sometimes not made.
And sometimes an inadequately informed prediction turns out
"wrong" in hindsight. In criminal law,' the regulator must decide
whether to treat these mistaken violators any differently from violators who knew that what they were doing was illegal.
Traditionally, courts treated them alike. "Ignorance of the law is
no excuse" is so widespread a maxim that it is one of the few
things many people do know about the law.' A recent line of
Supreme Court cases, however, permits mistake of law as a defense
to particular statutory crimes, including evading taxes,3 unauthorized selling and buying of food stamps,4 and more recently in
United States v Ratzlaf, violating the anti-structuring provisions of
the Bank Secrecy Act.5 Following this cue, several federal appellate
1Criminal law is the subject of this paper, but the broader issues of information
cost, uncertainty, and the form of legal rules apply similarly to civil law.
2 Compare William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Law of England 27 (U
Chicago, 1979) (maxim dates to Roman law).
3 Cheek v United States, 498 US 192 (1991).
4 Liparota v United States, 471 US 419 (1985).
5 510 US 135 (1994). Ratzlaf is part of a quartet of 1994 Supreme Court cases
dealing with mistake of fact or mistake of law in federal criminal statutes. The others are Staples v United States, 511 US 600 (1994) (mistake of fact as to nature of
weapon excuses liability under National Firearms Act), United States v X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 US 64 (1994) (mistake of fact as to performer's age excuses liability
under the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act), and Posters 'N'
Things v United States, 511 US 513 (1994) (neither mistake of fact nor mistake of
law excuses liability under Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act, 21 USC §
857).
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courts have expanded the list to crimes such as causing false
reports to be filed with the Federal Election Commission and dealing in firearms without a license. 6 The Supreme Court generally
crafts a mistake of law defense as a matter of statutory interpretation. Yet the same statutory phrases that mandated a defense in
these contexts proved insufficient to warrant mistake of law in
other contexts! Under existing analysis, whether mistake of law is
a defense to the myriad federal criminal statutes is highly unpredictable.8
Because mistake of law doctrine appears muddled, it provides a
useful opportunity to test the explanatory power of competing economic theories. Mistake of law doctrine goes to the heart of the
instrumental or deterrent effect of law, and because substantive
criminal law is mostly statutory and mistake of law is mostly judicial, it provides a lens through which to observe the interaction of
courts and legislatures. This paper attempts to answer the question: In what circumstances does economics predict that legislatures or courts will impose sanctions despite a mistake of law?
Our approach to this question is part of the inheritance from
Gary Becker's pathbreaking model of criminal law enforcement,
while offering a unique twist on his analysis.9 Becker, reviving a
tradition that dates at least to Jeremy Bentham, was the first modern theorist to model criminal law from an economic perspective. 10
Assuming fully informed rational actors, Becker analyzed the
trade-off faced by a social authority between enforcement efforts
and magnitude of sanctions. Several scholars have since explored
the information problems confronting the social authority, but it is
only recently that the consequences of information costs and
uncertainty confronting the actor have been rigorously examined.
A series of papers by Kaplow, Shavell, Polinsky, and others, trace
some of the effects of relaxing the full information assumption.
6 See United States v Curran, 20 F3d 560 (3d Cir 1994), and United States v
Obiechie, 38 F3d 309 (7th Cir 1994), respectively.
7 See, for example, United States v InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.,
402 US 558 (1971); Hamlingv United States, 418 US 87 (1974); United States v Yermian, 468 US 63 (1984).
' Throughout this paper, we use the term "defense" interchangeably with
"excuse", and intend no implications with respect to burdens of proof.
9 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol
Econ 169 (1968).
10See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum
L Rev 1193, 1193 (1985).
"The two papers most relevant to mistake of law are Louis Kaplow, Optimal
Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether
Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J L Econ & Org 93 (1990) ("Kaplow, Optimal Deter-
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The emphasis in all these papers is on social optimality: modeling
the optimal sanction, for example, or the optimal provision of legal
advice, given that information is costly.12 In this paper, unlike
other law and economics treatments of information cost, we do not
ask what the socially optimal rule is; such an inquiry may be
futile, given its somewhat heroic assumption that substantive
criminal prohibitions are themselves chosen to be socially optimal.
Further, none of the papers, including Becker's, seeks to explore the
behavior of courts or analyzes legal doctrine. For this task, we use
as a starting point a different classic intuition of Becker's-regarding political outcomes3-and then explore how legal information
cost and uncertainty affect enforcement of those outcomes.
The one paper that does discuss the courts' treatment of private
information cost is Parker's The Economics of Mens Rea. 14 Treating mens rea as the common law response to the problem of costly
information, Parker's article adds considerable nuance to the
Becker thesis. His discussion, however, focuses not on mistake of
law, but rather on what he terms the "self-characterization costs"
of determining the nature and character of one's acts and the cirrence"), and Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About ContemplatedActs: The Decision
to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability,and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J
Legal Stud 123 (1988) ("Shavell, Legal Advice"). The Shavell article in particular
provided us a useful framework for analyzing the value of legal advice, although the
formulas we derive differ slightly from the formulas appearing in his Appendix. See
also Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39
J L & Econ 191 (1996); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J L & Econ 1 (1994); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J L Econ & Org
306 (1992); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Legal Error,Litigation, and the
Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J L Econ & Org 99 (1989); John E. Calfee and Richard
Craswell, Deterrence and UncertainLegal Standards, 2 J L Econ & Org 279 (1986)
("Calfee & Craswell, Deterrence"); I.P.L. Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in
the Presence of Judicial Error,6 Intl Rev L & Econ 101 (1986) ("Png, Optimal Subsidies").
12 One paper that does take a public choice approach to information cost is
Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers' Benefit From Litigation, 12 Intl
Rev L & Econ 381 (1992) (lawyers will prefer an "intermediate" level of legal complexity). There also have been a number of positive analyses of criminal law. See in
particular, Isaac Ehrlich, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of
Justice: A Positive Analysis, 2 Intl Rev L & Econ 3 (1982), which points out the
areas where the efficiency paradigm fails to accord with the reality of criminal law.
Compare Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw (cited in note 10) (common law criminal law consistent with efficiency paradigm).
13Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influence, 98 Q J Econ 371 (1983) ("Becker, Competition Among Pressure
Groups").
14
Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 Va L Rev 741 (1993) ("Parker,
Mens Rea").
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cumstances surrounding those acts. Parker assumes a perfectly
known legal standard, and to the extent he considers legal uncertainty, he treats mistakes of law and of fact as analytically indistinct. More significantly, the public choice lens in our paper
focuses us in a different direction.
Our approach, motivated by the public choice insight, starts
with the recognition that substantive criminal prohibitions often
will not reflect social optima. However, prohibitions usually will
reflect the preferences of durable political coalitions. In creating
the bargains desired by politically powerful coalitions, legislators
will not always prefer maximal enforcement against mistaken violators. Sometimes, to sustain the political equilibrium that gave
rise to the prohibition, legislators will prefer to excuse certain
classes of violators, for otherwise the legislation demanded by the
coalition will collapse or be weakened. And as we observe in the
case law, courts do not disturb the legislative bargain; in this context at least, their incentives appear to be effectively aligned with
legislative desires.
We begin by sketching a theory regarding the incentives of government regulators (Part II), and then, after outlining a model of
how costly information affects deterrence and knowledge of the
law (Part III.A), we predict how regulators, particularly legislatures,
would prefer to treat mistaken offenders when legal information is
costly (Part ll.B). The short answer is that, in many circumstances
the legislature prefers no mistake of law defense, but in some limited cases it will prefer a specialized reasonable mistake of law
defense, designed to preserve the incentives to learn the law to the
maximum extent feasible.' 5 Part IV then examines the role that the
judiciary, with its own set of incentives and constraints, might be
expected to play in fashioning criminal law doctrines such as mistake doctrine.
In Part V, we apply the analysis to the Supreme Court cases and
their progeny. Our analysis accounts for the increasing, but still
limited, acceptance of mistake of law. It reconciles four Supreme
's Of course, mistake of law is only one lever that regulators can pull to deal
with the problems of costly information, ex ante uncertainty, and ex post error.
Others include adjusting the level of precision of the law (using rules as opposed to
standards), adjusting the sanction, or even changing the number of adjudicators or
enforcers. And of course, the substantive rule itself can be altered to account for
information problems, as is the case for many constitutional decisions. We touch on
these subjects here, but we postpone an in-depth model of the complex relationship
between the form of the law, the sanction, information costs and uncertainty to a
future paper.
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Court cases dealing with mistake of Constitutional law,1 6 one of
which, Screws v United States, will be reexamined by the Court
this term.17 Our analysis illuminates the disparate treatments of
mistake of fact and law, a difference that has puzzled both economic and rights-based commentators, as well as the differing
treatments of mistake of law in the civil and criminal contexts. It
also helps explain a prominent example of Congress' disagreement
with the Supreme Court on mistake of law (Congress overturned
Ratzlaf by amending the statute). And perhaps most important
from a doctrinal standpoint, we demonstrate how the federal courts
use a stylized de facto negligence standard for mistake of law, even
though for reasons of statutory interpretation courts often are constrained in their announced rules to excuse either all mistakes, or
none. 18
Finally, we use the mistake cases as one data set that helps
answer a broad question: How do courts respond to legislative
enactments? Our review of federal mistake of law cases leads us to
conclude that, rather than promoting social optimality, the courts
are often more appropriately seen as enforcing and enhancing legislative bargains. We argue informally in Part VI that a public
choice approach explains the case law better than models based on
social optimality, although in some secondary sense courts often
do enhance efficiency. In presenting this argument, we hope to
spark further public choice analyses of criminal law doctrines.
II. REGULATION AS A MEANS TO CHANNEL
BEHAVIOR
Criminal law is enacted, interpreted, and enforced by government.
It is a familiar tenet of both public choice and political science that
our servants in public office may not be perfect agents of the pub16 The four cases are Cheek v United States, 498 US 192 (1991), Hanling v

United States, 418 US 87 (1974), Screws v United States, 325 US 91 (1945), and
United States v Murdock, 290 US 389 (1933).

17See United States v Lanier, 116 S Ct 2522 (1996)

(granting certiorari to address

the scope of the holding in Screws).
"8Some commentators have made normative arguments in favor of a "reasonable" mistake of law defense. See H.L.A. Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L
& Contemp Probs 401 (1958) (for mala prohibita crimes, defendants should either
know or have good reason to know obligations); Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the

Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 Wm & Mary L Rev 671 (1976) (arguing for reasonable mistake of law standard); Paul H. Robinson, 2 CriminalLaw Defenses ch 5 §
182(d) (West, 1984) (same). To our knowledge, however, only one other paper
observes the use of "reasonableness" as a de facto governing standard for mistake of
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lic weal.19 Regulators-which we initially define broadly to include
the legislature, enforcement agencies such as the Justice Department, hybrid enforcement/lawmaking institutions such as the
Internal Revenue Service, and the courts-have their own interests, which are sometimes contrary to "social welfare."
Thus, in terms of prediction or description, the import of
nuanced analysis of the socially optimal criminal law or sanctions
is not clear. This is especially true of criminal law because it is
almost exclusively statutory; academic scholars at least debate
whether courts can be expected to pursue efficiency, whereas they
have long abandoned the belief that legislatures and bureaucracies
are driven inexorably toward the "public good." And even where
regulators desire efficiency, there is no reason to believe they can
effectively collect the information necessary to calculate the optimal rule or sanction.2" After all, Kaplow convincingly demonstrated the near impossibility of the task when he derived the quite
complex socially optimal sanction given costly information to individuals. 1 Presumably courts are even less well-equipped to ascertain the socially optimal treatment of criminal law, assuming the
term has any definite meaning.22
To be sure, models of socially optimal criminal law are useful,
but they have limited predictive value. Combining an understanding of the socially optimal result with an understanding of how reglaw generally, and then only for state courts in the early 1900's. See Edwin R. Keedy,
Ignorance and Mistake in the CriminalLaw, 22 Harv L Rev 75 (1908) (ignorance not
excused, but state courts sometimes excuse reasonable mistake as to whether facts
constitute illegality). But compare George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of
Excusing Conditions,47 So Cal L Rev 1269, 1298-99 (1974) (with a few exceptions,
reasonable mistakes of law generally not excused by states). More important, we give
analytic content to the concept of reasonableness, and show that our stylized notion
of reasonableness seems to be followed, at least roughly, by the federal courts.
19See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Thilock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of ConstitutionalDemocracy at 4 (U Mich, 5th ed 1974).
20 See Parker, Mens Rea (cited in note 14).
21See Kaplow, OptimalDeterrence (cited in note 11).
' Rubin and Priest have each argued that the common law proceeds toward efficiency as a consequence of party incentives to litigate. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J Legal Stud 51 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J Legal Stud 65 (1977) ("Priest,
The Common Law Process"). While statutes do generate a limited scope of "common law" in the process of interpretation, statutory constraints often prevent the
litigation process from moving toward efficiency in the context of criminal law.
Moreover, Rubin argues that if only one of the litigants is a repeat player, legal rules
developed by the courts may well be biased in that litigant's favor. Rubin, 6 J Legal
Stud at 55-56. And there is no reason to believe the government fully internalizes
the costs of litigation. The forces tending toward efficient precedents thus seem particularly lacking in the context of criminal law.
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ulators will likely act may enable one to see the disparity. And theoretically, if one's normative goal were social optimality, the lawmaking and enforcing procedures might be adjusted to nudge the
potential substantive outcomes toward efficiency. But in the
absence of a theory as to why regulators will internalize the consequences of sub-optimal law, assuming they will do so and then
determining the "best" rule cannot be the full story.
Regulators, of course, are not free to dictate whatever law they
desire. Legislatures, where the bulk of criminal law is promulgated,
are constrained in the sense that politicians rely on public approval
for election or re-election. Yet legislators obtain election and reelection by fusing together winning coalitions of groups, each with
its own private interests. Once in office, a legislator can be
expected to better serve those coalitions that support him than the
population as a whole.' This may include using the criminal law
to help transfer wealth from losing to winning coalitions. Criminal
law can in some circumstances be an especially tempting means
for coalitions wishing to bend the law in their favor, because it
entails a greater public subsidy (police, prosecutors, prisons) than
does civil law to help maximize the effectiveness of those transfers. 24 For our purposes, the phrase "wealth transfers" need not be
confined to monetary transfers-for example, coalitions may
attempt to criminalize drug use either because it enhances their
wealth or because they simply prefer to live in a society without
drugs. Regardless, "serving the public" in this sense is certainly not
guaranteed to improve social welfare, for successful transfers to the
winners need only be net welfare-producing for the winners, not for
the population as a whole. Criminal sanctions enforcing racial
oppression (such as Jim Crow laws), or licensing requirements for
pharmacists, or perhaps much of the regulatory state, are all pre23 See Becker, Competition Among Pressure Groups (cited in note 13); William
Dougan and James Snyder, Are Rents Fully Dissipated?, 77 Public Choice 793
(1993); William Dougan & James Snyder, Interest Group Politics Under Majority
Rule, 61 J Pub Econ 49 (1996).

24 The public subsidy of enforcement enhances the value of criminal prohibitions, but heightened procedural protections associated with criminal law may
reduce the behavioral effect. And if the civil law provides monetary transfers to winners when losers fail to comply with the law, civil law may provide a greater likelihood that winners actually gain from legislation. Depending on how these factors
play out, the coalitions seeking prohibitions may at times prefer civil sanctions.
Further, to the extent heightened procedural protections reduce compliance, they
also reduce overcompliance, which in some cases may make criminal law the preferred outcome of the regulated industry. None of this significantly affects our
analysis, however, because many of the statutes we examine involve both criminal
and civil sanctions.
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dictable wealth transfers that presumably do not maximize "social
welfare."
And even where, by happy coincidence, the substantive content
of law bequeathed by the legislature is wealth maximizing, those
charged with enforcement may not pursue optimality. First,
enforcers do not pay for regulations: taxpayers, consumers, and the
regulated entities bear the costs. Second, administrative agencies
exist to regulate, and they will often work to expand the scope of
regulation beyond the optimal. Indeed, some regulators depend on
continued harmful activity to survive; for them, complete deterrence is counter-productive. Government agencies often have
built-in features designed to alleviate some of these problemsoversight by other branches of government, for example, or limited
tenure of employees. But the inherent "agency" costs are
inescapable.
Because of all these problems, we make a different assumption.
Whatever motivates the regulators, it seems clear that criminal law
is essentially a tool for channeling behavior. Whether the regulators or lawmakers themselves are imposing their view of a Good
Society on the citizenry, or are simply enacting the desires of a
winning coalition into law, criminal law is designed and utilized to
deter certain acts subject to constraints we identify in Part I.
Achieving this deterrence is not free, of course: someone must bear
administrative costs, sanction costs, and "overchanneling" costs.
Throughout this paper, we use "underchanneling" and "overchanneling" from the point of view of the regulator's preferences. As
discussed in the next Part, we assume that a regulator will attempt
to maximize compliance with its mandates. Underchanneling,
then, refers to less than perfect compliance, whereas overchanneling refers to situations where, because of the law, people fail to act
in ways considered legal by the regulator. Because we use the regulators' preferences rather than social optimality as our benchmark,
these terms differ from the terms "underdeterrence" and "overdeterrence" as used in other papers.
This does not mean, however, that deadweight costs born by
criminals, taxpayers, or the regulated are irrelevant. Extending the
theories of Becker and Peltzman,25 interest groups are more likely to
succeed in obtaining and then retaining legislation if they can minimize the social costs of the benefits they seek. As a consequence,
legislators serving those interests may very well partially internalize information costs and the deadweight costs of enforcement and
2 Becker, Competition Among Pressure Groups (cited in note 13); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976).
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punishment. But the value to a group of a substantive criminal
statute is enhanced the more effectively it channels behavior. Minimizing the costs of channeling is helpful to that group only if it can
be done without significantly affecting the channeling itself.
Of course, Congress is well aware that the other branches of government play a role in the behavioral incentives that individuals
ultimately confront. Administrative agencies, prosecutors and
courts might be expected to act in a manner that distorts the incentives Congress attempts to create. As a result, the legislature may
draft a substantive criminal statute more broadly (or narrowly)
than it might in isolation, to achieve more effectively the goals of
the interest groups served. In the end, however, we assume the legislature attempts to maximize compliance (regardless of social
optimality), subject to the constraint of avoiding undue costs to
political opponents of the legislation.
III. CHANNELING BEHAVIOR WHEN
INFORMATION IS COSTLY
A regulator's ability to channel behavior turns on the incentives
that individuals face. Both the regulators and the regulated will
presumably respond rationally to the fact that law is costly and
uncertain. In this Part, we present a model of how people will
respond to their uncertainties about regulation.
A. Criminal Law and Actors' Incentives
Assume a risk neutral person is contemplating whether to commit an
act, which may or may not be illegal. If he does not act, nothing happens. If he acts, he will receive an expected benefit b > 0. He also will
incur a sanction F if and only if (1) the act is illegal, (2) he is caught,
and (3) he is convicted. Let p = the person's subjective probability the
act is illegal; r = his subjective probability he will be apprehended if
the act is illegal; q = his subjective probability he will be convicted if
the act is illegal and he is caught.26 We assume p, q and r are independent of one another. We assume further the actor knows F."
26 We assume that the probability of apprehension and conviction if the act is

legal is zero. That is, we assume no perceived error in the court's determination of
what is illegal. See Png, Optimal Subsidies (cited in note 11); Calfee & Craswell,
Deterrence (cited in note 11); Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Findingand Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty,61 So Cal L

Rev 137 (1987).
2 If the law requires action, such as that certain precautions be taken, it does not
change the analysis. The act can be thought of as "acting without the precaution,"
and not acting becomes "acting with the precaution." The benefit b equals the cost
savings from not taking the precaution.
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The person will act if and only if his benefit from acting is
greater than the expected consequences of acting, that is:
b > pqrF.

(1)

For simplicity, we set rF = S, because we are not focusing on or
varying r, the probability of apprehension. (S was Becker's
"expected sanction"; he implicitly assumed that p = 1 and q = 1.)
We now find that the person will act if and only if:
(2)

b > pqS.

The probability of conviction if the act is illegal, q, can turn on
many things, such as the extent of procedural protection. We examine one factor: mistake of law. In the absence of a mistake of law
excuse, we assume the person will be convicted (that is, q = 1). If
mistake of law excuses, we assume that q = 0 if the excuse is available to the defendant. We consider these two possibilities in turn.
1. Incentives to buy legal information in the absence of mistake
of law defense
Here q = 1, so that the person will act if and only if b > pS. The person is more likely to act when he has a high benefit relative to his
expected sanction, and when his prior perception of the law's
applicability (p) is low. For a given benefit and sanction, there is a
certain threshold prior probability k = b/S, which will trigger the
person's decision to act (or not). The expression can then be rewritten such that the person acts if and only if:
p < k.

(3)

Informally, this means that the person looks at the benefit he
expects from acting, and at the legal sanction he might get if it
turns out the act is illegal, and then calculates how certain he
needs to be that the act is legal before he acts. The "needed certainty" that the act is legal is represented by (1-k), with k being the
threshold certainty the act is illegal. If he has a lot to gain, his
threshold k will be high: he will act even if it is quite likely the act
violates the law. If he has little to gain, his k will be low: he will
not act unless and until he is quite sure the act is legal.
Assume the person can improve his prior estimate of the law's
applicability by purchasing information at cost c. This may mean
the cost of going to a lawyer or a library to look up a statute, or it
may mean the cost of additional research to enhance the person's
confidence in his estimate p. The cost c is unique for each person
and each act. Buying the information does not itself affect liability,
because no mistake defense is available.
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Of course, the decision whether to purchase the information
must be made without knowledge of what the information will
portend. Nonetheless, the value of the information will depend on
the individual's expectations of the possible outcomes from investing in the information, with the possible outcomes defined as a
probability distribution f(pl), where Pi here represents the updated
probability the act is illegal, as gleaned from all available legal
2 8 The prior probability
information.
p equals the expected value of
2

f(pl).

Restating this in English, a person can buy information about
legality (such as by consulting a lawyer) if he wishes. There is a
range of potential probabilities that could come back from the
lawyer, represented by pl: for example the lawyer could say, forget
it, the act is illegal (p1 = 1), or the law is a toss-up (pl = .5), or the
act is clearly legal (p1 = 0). Before deciding whether to buy the information, the person must anticipate in some sense what the lawyer
will say. These expectations are probabilities represented by f(pl)
for each outcome Pl.
The expected value of legal information depends on whether
the person would act in the absence of the information. See Figure 1. If the person would be inclined to act without information
(p < k), the information has no value unless it induces the person
to refrain from acting (Pi < k). To simplify, we consider the special
case where the information purchased will provide a certain outcome: that is, the lawyer will tell the person either that the act is
legal (P, =3 00) or illegal (PI = 1). The expected value of the information is:

value = p(S - b).
28 For a description of this general approach and its roots in economics, see J. Hirshleffer and John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertaintyand Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J Econ Lit 1375, 1395 (1971).
9 The person's confidence in his prior probability will be reflected in the variance of f(pl).
30 In the general case, the information will induce the person to refrain only if
b < pS, in other words P, > b/S = k. For every posterior outcome p, > k, the person
will decide not to act and will thus end up benefitting by (pjS - b). His expected
benefit is (pjS - b) because by not acting, he will no longer benefit from the act (losing b), but will save the sanction cost that would have been imposed on him with a
probability of pl. Thus, the expected value of the information will be:

v = JpS

- b) f(pl) dpl.

(4a)

In the special case where the law can be known for certain, then we set pi = either
1 or 0, with f(l) = p, and f(0) = 1 - p. Then (4a) reduces to v = p(S - b), as in the text.
See Shavell, Legal Advice, Appendix at 147 (cited in note 11) for a similar result
expressed and derived slightly differently.
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Intuitively, this simple expression means that a person who
would otherwise act and risk a sanction S, can get value from finding out for certain the actual probability of illegality. With a prior
probability p, the person will change his mind and not act, thus
saving S and foregoing b. The expected value of the information is
positive if 0 < p < k and b < S; that is, if the person is uncertain
about whether the act is illegal, and if the person could save money
by changing his mind and not acting. Recall that we assumed individuals are risk neutral: the information has value above and
beyond any benefit to reducing risk, because information could
(with probability p) increase the expected value of not acting to the
point where refraining is better than acting.
Information will be purchased if and only if its expected value
exceeds its cost. Conversely, those who do not purchase information will be the people for whom:
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p(S - b) < c.

(4)

Equation (4) is more likely to hold for
1.
2.
3.
4.

high information cost c,
low prior probability p,
high benefit b,
low sanction S.

Of the individuals for whom equation (4) holds, some will turn
out to have committed illegal acts. These individuals, who choose
not to purchase information and whose acts turn out to be viewed
by the regulator as illegal, are "underchanneled." An underchanneled individual is located at node 4 of Figure 1.
Equation (4) applies only to people who would act without information. There is another group who might remain ignorant: those
who would decide not to act. If the person, based on his initial estimate p, has initially decided not to act, then information on the
law will be valuable to him only if the resulting probabilities
would counsel him to act. For him, information has positive value
only where k < p < 1. Following the reasoning above, he will not
buy information if and only if:
(1 - p)b < c. 3

(5)

Intuitively, equation (5) means that information has potential
value to those who otherwise would refrain from acting only if the
benefit to be gained b, times the probability of legality (1 - p),
exceeds the cost of the information. Some people for whom equation (5) holds will be overchanneled: their acts would have been
legal (ex post, p, = 0). Equation (5) is more likely to hold for
1.
2.
3.
4.

high information cost c,
high prior probability p,
low benefit b,
high sanction S.32

In the general case, the information has value only if b > pS. For each p, < b/S,
he will act and gain a benefit b, with an expected sanction (given the new information) of pjS. Thus, the value of the information is
31

k

b

-

pS) f(pl) dpl.

(5a)

In the special case where P, = 0 (he may be told for certain the act is legal), and f(O)
= 1 - p, then (5a) reduces to (1 - p) b. Thus, the person will remain ignorant and not
act if (I- p)b < c.
32 Strictly speaking, equation (5) is independent of S. However, as the sanction is
raised, k (= b/S) falls, and more people fall into the category of refraining from acting. Some of these people will not purchase information (that is, will be "overchanneled"). The effect is clearer in the general case set forth in the preceding footnote.
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2. Incentives if mistake of law is an excuse
Mistake of law potentially applies to the unfortunates who acted
with the belief that their conduct was legal (or likely legal), but
find their conduct was in fact illegal. If they are exonerated, however, they are hardly unfortunate. To the extent that mistake of law
is known to be a defense, ignorance will become the preferred route
for many of those who wish to act. In the terms of the model, not
buying information actually reduces q, the probability of conviction. n other words, the expected payoff from remaining ignorant
and acting, represented by nodes 3 and 4 in Figure 1, increases relative to the other possible courses of action. From a regulator's perspective, "underchanneling" will expand-more people will take
prohibited actions. For example, if a regulator announces a "rule"
that q = 0 for anyone who is "mistaken" in the sense of p < 1, then
everyone aware of this rule who is in the slightest unsure about a
prohibition's applicability will act and none of them will investigate the law, because b > pqS = 0. In other words, those who would
not have acted without information, because their expected payoffs
located them at any of nodes 5-8, now find themselves willing to
act without information, node 4, since acting entails no cost. Similarly, those individuals at node 2 who would otherwise have investigated the law and ultimately not acted will simply forgo an investigation and act, node 4.
It is true that this "ostrich" effect will occur only for those who
are aware that mistake of law could be a defense. Such persons,
however, are likely to be sophisticated with respect to the law in
question, and thus be the persons most likely to be influenced by
the underlying statute to begin with. Hence a mistake of law
defense carries with it a particular danger for a regulator attempting to maximize the law's effect on behavior. Further, even unsophisticated parties would be affected by a general mistake of law
defense. The maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" would
gradually lose its force as people slowly learned that it is false in
many circumstances. Or put more formally, the marginal cost of
people learning that mistake of law is (or might be) a defense to any
number of crimes may over time be quite low, because it is something they can learn about criminal law generally without knowing
the details of particular prohibitions.
To preserve the channeling effect of the law, a mistake of law
excuse must be more narrow. That could be done using two limiting rules. First, "mistake" could be defined as having a low prior
probability estimate, p. Second, the regulator could set q = 0 only
for those reasonably mistaken as to the law. "Reasonable" could be
defined several ways, but we focus on one-where the benefit to
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"learning" the law is less than the cost, so it makes sense for the
individual to not buy the legal information before acting. In the
model, this is the category of persons for whom equation (4)
holds-p(S - b) < c. These individuals could not have been induced
to learn the law, even in a regime disallowing mistake of law
defenses. The rule helps prevent a growth in the number of individuals for whom node 4 is the payoff-maximizing behavior.
This decision rule will have several effects relative to a rule
where no mistake of law is allowed:
1. It will save wasteful sanctioning costs that the social
authority would otherwise have to bear.
2. It will decrease overchanneling, because qS falls as q
falls off of 1, making acting more attractive than not acting. For example, a person who thinks but is not sure
that a tax deduction is permissible may take the deduction if he suspects he can rely on a mistake defense if his
guess turns out to be incorrect. This individual has a
low p and finds investing in information, given c, not
worthwhile. In terms of Figure 1, the mistake rule
allows the individual to move from node 7 to node 3,
because he knows he will be excused if it turns out he
was actually in node 4.
3. It will increase underchanneling, but much less than a
pure mistake of law defense, because it will excuse only
those who would not have purchased the information in
any event, while leaving intact the incentives for others
to invest in information. That is, nobody will move
from node 2 into node 4. There will be some increased
underchanneling, because more people will decide to act
in the first place and thus there will be more people who
potentially could fall into node 4 in Figure 1, when without the excuse they would have been in node 6 or 8.

33 More precisely, suppose the act is in fact illegal. There will be some people
who would not have acted if no mistake defense is available (q = 1), because b < qpS
= pS. These people can get q = 0, and thus be able to act, only if they meet the conditions of the defense: that is, p is low and p(S - b) < c. Thus, additionalillegal acts
will be committed by those for whom b < pS, p[S - b) < c, and p is low, presumably
a small group. Nonetheless, the model's result that sanctioning those who would
not learn the law in any event still causes some reduced deterrence is surprising.
Compare Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions As a Deterrent, 85 Colum L Rev 1232, 1255 (1985) (Shavell, Nonmonetary Sanctions") (reasonable mistake of law optimal because sanctioning a reasonably mistaken person will not reduce deterrence).
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We explore the consequences of reasonable mistake of law in detail
in the next section.
B. Legal Implications for The Regulator
Assuming a given substantive prohibition, we consider two factors
that can affect both awareness of and compliance with that prohibition: first, the sanction, and second, mistake of law doctrine.
1. Enhancing the bargain by maximizing the sanction
Given that regulators will want to maximize their control over
others' behavior, at first blush it seems the easiest way to accomplish this is to set the expected sanction maximally high, because
that will maximize compliance. From Part H.A, increasing the fine
or prison term, a component of the sanction S, causes more individuals who would have committed the illegal act to now refrain,
both because fewer people will act in the first place under equation
(1), and because more people who are considering acting will first
buy information to determine if their act is illegal, as shown in
equation (4). But there are two brakes on the willingness of legislatures to maximize the sanction.
First, the deterrent effect of a law is a function of the marginal
or additional sanction for committing the act. If we assume an
upper bound on punishment that can be inflicted because of, for
example, the Eighth Amendment, then this punishment must be
reserved for the most serious crimes. Behavior less harmful from
the regulator's perspective must be punished less severely, if the
actor is to have any incentive to refrain from committing more
harmful acts. For example, an EPA regulation sanctioning polluters
with the death penalty will result in reduced pollution, but it
might also result in murdered EPA regulators. An act that is farther
down the list of undesirable activities might therefore have a lower
sanction attached to it than necessary to eradicate
it, in order to
34
reserve that sanction for more harmful behavior.
Second, the regulator may have concerns other than entirely
eliminating the act. Regulators often want to channel acts: that is,
eliminate some acts but not other closely related acts, or eliminate
some particular aspects of general conduct that is itself deemed
" The marginal deterrence point has a direct analogue in the efficiency literature. See, for example, Steven Shavell, A Note On MarginalDeterrence, 12 Intl Rev
L & Econ 345 (1992). Our point is that even if a regulator's objective is not social
optimality, but rather compliance with inefficient laws, a similar constraint on
sanctions obtains.
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valuable to the regulators. A high sanction might deter persons
who engage in favored "nearby" or related activity from obtaining
information that their acts are in fact not illegal. This follows from
equations (1) and (5): an increase in S will mean that more people
will not act even though their conduct is in fact legal.
For example, if the sanction for dumping bottles in the trash is
raised high enough to deter all individuals with high benefits or
low probability estimates, then others will begin throwing diapers
and egg cartons in the recycling bin to avoid a fine for discarding
them. Or people might take all their garbage somewhere else,
reminding themselves to vote for the opposition candidate in the
next election. In short, a regulator's attempts to decrease underchanneling likely lead to increased overchanneling. And the social
costs of overchanneling decrease the likelihood that the regulation
will persist over time.
Further, this problem is enhanced to the extent the law is inherently uncertain. Recall that we defined the threshold probability
(1 - k) = 1 - b/S as the individual's required certainty that an act is
legal before he will act. The higher the S, the higher this threshold.
If the law is inherently uncertain, placing a ceiling on even the
informed probability level (one can never be more than 75% certain that a given deduction is permissible under the tax laws, for
example), then increasing S means more people will never be able
to be certain enough that their act is legal. They simply will not
act. Because the tax codes are used to channel behavior as well as
raise revenues, uncertainties regarding deductions, when coupled
with relatively high sanctions, can limit the desired behavioral
effects of the code.
The severity of the overchanneling problem faced by the regulator turns on several factors. First, and most obviously, the more a
regulator, through the group he serves, values nearby or related
activities, the more severe his constraints. Second, the more discrete and easily separable the prohibited acts are from related conduct the less the regulator worries about overchanneling. If individuals can cheaply ascertain whether acts are within the sanctioned
group (that is, if c, the cost of information, is low), then increasing
the sanction will not significantly increase overchanneling. Third,
overchanneling turns on the elasticity of supply of the activity. For
example, sanctions for non-compliance with building codes raise
the cost of building; this matters to the building regulators if the
additional cost significantly reduces the amount of construction.
Of course, overchanneling is relevant only to the extent the regulator cares about sustaining the supply of related or more general
activity. Sometimes the regulator will be indifferent to the deterrent

HeinOnline -- 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 234 1996-1997

Richard S. Murphy and Erin A. O'Hara

235

effect on "legal" conduct. And occasionally the chilling effect on
legal conduct is part of the point of the regulation; because of drafting or constitutional limitations, the regulator defines the prohibition more narrowly than preferred. Examples of this include 24-hour
waiting periods for abortion, and to pick two examples from mistake
of law cases, licensing requirements for hand grenades and restrictions on obscenity. And to return to the building code example, the
very purpose of some building code legislation may be to discourage
construction and thus enhance property values.
At some point, however, increasing sanctions will deter activities on the other side of the legislature's intended line. Consequently, we expect an inherent moderating influence on sanctions.
And this conclusion has little to do with optimal sanctions. There
may be many acts in which the social benefit is greater than the
social harm, but the regulator does not care and still wants to prohibit the act; even then, the regulator is somewhat constrained in
setting the sanction. As one would expect, there is an equilibrium
sanction level that maximizes the regulator's desired influence
over conduct.
Note how our approach to sanctions (an approach we reprise in
mistake of law) differs from both sides of an important normative
debate in the literature. Becker's original model was a pricing
model: assuming perfect information, the optimal expected sanction S (which is the product of the probability of apprehension r
and the penalty if apprehended) equals the social harm of the
crime. That way, only criminals with benefits greater than the
social harm will in fact commit the crime. Two criticisms arose,
however: precision in "pricing" crimes is impossible because of
information costs confronting the social authority, and what we
really want is to eradicate crimes. Accepting this criticism, many
economists retreated into a theory of efficient sanctions that
"devalues" the benefit to the criminal and ignores overdeterrence
of criminals: sanctions should be and are set "high" to eradicate
crime."5 We take a descriptive approach to the problem. The regulator does want to eradicate the activity that a coalition desires to
prohibit, but at the lowest cost to other members of the coalition
or even opposing coalitions. Thus, it cares about marginal deter's See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J
Pol Econ 526, 527 (1970) (disvaluing offenders' gain, and criticizing Becker); Shavell,

Nonmonetary Sanctions at 1234 (cited in note 33) (disvaluing offenders' gain); Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw at 1215 (cited in note 10) (for common law crimes, optimal number of offenses is "close to zero"); Robert Cooter,
Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum L Rev 1523, 1550 (1984) (optimal amount of
offenses is zero).
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rence, partially internalizes overchanneling (both of which have
similar but not identical counterparts in the efficiency literature),
and ends up with a sanction that achieves a "compromise" compliance level. And as we argue next, the legislature then relies on
the courts to enforce the legislative bargain by maintaining compliance but minimizing sanctions that are wasteful.3 6
2. Enhancing the bargain through mistake of law
As the model shows, certain categories of persons may be highly
unlikely to know and thus be influenced by a given prohibition. If
the governing law is in the form of a complex rule, mistake of law
could be used to remove wasteful prosecution of such individuals,
and to reduce the overchanneling costs of the prohibition. (And
more rarely, if the governing law is in the form of a hopelessly
vague standard, courts can use the void-for-vagueness doctrine to
insist on re-formulation by the legislature.) In this way, the legislative bargain is actually enhanced: costs to potential opponents of
the legislation are lowered, enabling the coalitions to achieve more
to begin with for the same cost.
Yet a mistake of law defense can frustrate investment in legal
information, inhibiting the overall effect of specific prohibitions.
Thus, we would predict legislatures not to explicitly write into
criminal statutes the requirement that the prosecution prove
knowledge of the law. Still, there are circumstances where a narrow defense could promote the efficient implementation of the
criminal law, with negligible effect on compliance. As we argued
earlier, the legislature can more effectively deliver subsidies to
interest groups if it can minimize the social costs of doing so. A
"reasonable" mistake defense defined as in the model (low p, and
p(S-b) < c) reduces both overcharmeling costs and costs of sanctions
36

Our conclusions also differ from Parker, Mens Rea (cited in note 14). Parker

views mens rea as valuable in the efficiency sense, and persistent, because it helps
minimize excessive information costs partly created by sanctions that he perceives
as too high. The descriptive aspect of Parker's article rests on two assumptions:
first, an explicit assumption that criminal sanctions are set higher than socially
optimal to eliminate rather than price crimes, and second, an implicit (and controversial) assumption that judges are maximizing efficiency by countering the overinvestment in information created by excessive sanctions. As the text shows, as to the
first assumption we argue instead that the government's ability to eradicate crime
is often practically limited. And to the extent sanctions are excessive from a social
optimality perspective, we argue that the Court is enforcing legislative preferences
for a sub-optimal criminal law regime rather than mitigating the laws' effects. As
can been seen in Part V, at least with respect to mistake of law we believe the cases
comport more closely with our suppositions.
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imposed on the "undeterrable". Punishment is costly, both in
terms of the monetary cost of imprisonment and the additional
court time consumed by defendants contesting their sanction.
Therefore, because it does not significantly inhibit channeling of
behavior, but saves costs elsewhere, we should see courts excusing
those reasonably mistaken as to the law.
Our reasonableness definition requires some qualifications,
however. Equation (4) could be true because of a low prior probability p, a high information gathering cost c, a high benefit, or a
low sanction. The first two variables seem intuitive: If an actor had
a prior belief that the act was unlikely to violate the law, and/or
learning the details of the prohibition was expensive, sanctioning
the individual has little effect. But the third reason-"the act was
very beneficial to me"-hardly provides a compelling excuse, especially if legislatures are trying to prohibit rather than price the
activity3 7 Because regulators cannot completely eradicate acts
given the pressures limiting sanctions mentioned earlier, excusing
the people who are not deterred because their benefits are high relative to those limited sanctions could seriously weaken channeling
efforts. Moreover, even individuals who enjoy a high enough benefit from criminal activity to engage in that activity one time might
choose a lower level of activity if they are sanctioned, given that
the marginal benefit to the activity presumably declines the more
it is engaged in.
As for the sanctions, equation (4) seems to predict that the mistake of law defense will be observed less often when sanctions are
high. The higher the expected sanction, the less often people will
reasonably act without verifying that their acts are legal.3" (In terms
of Figure 1, the payoff to node 4 falls as S rises.) Thus, the need for a
mistake of law defense is reduced because it will rarely be reasonable to not know the law. But there are countervailing effects. First,
the higher the sanction, the more costly each individual imposition
" Suppose an individual views it 50% likely that his planned building is in violation of code, yet decides to build anyway because he will save $5,000 by not complying and the sanction is only $6,000. He also could have hired experts for $1,000
to determine for certain whether he is in compliance, but he does not do so, because
p(S - b) = 500 is less than c = 1,000. A regulator desiring compliance with building
codes will not allow the builder an excuse no matter how "reasonable" it was for
him to not look up the law.
" Recall that the model assumes the actor knows his expected sanction if his
conduct turns out to be illegal. If the actor is mistaken as to both the legality of the
act and the severity of the sanction (because, for example, he does not even know
the entire regulatory environment he is in exists), then punishment would be pointless for him. But presumably, at some point higher sanctions themselves enhance
the awareness of a regulatory regime.
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of the sanction will be to the regulator, both in terms of vigorous
litigation and actual imprisonment costs. Second, recall that the
higher the sanction, the larger the overchanneling costs. In other
words, higher sanctions lead more people to refrain from acting in
ways valuable to the regulator out of fear of being mistaken.3 9 (In
terms of Figure 1, more people do not act as S rises, even for conduct that turns out to be legal, node 7.) The net effect on channeling is therefore indeterminate. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, we
make no prediction about whether a mistake of law excuse is more
likely when sanctions are higher. Interestingly, the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts have in fact employed mistake of law in
both high and low sanction environments.40
IV. JUDICIAL INFLUENCE
Occasionally, a single regulatory body manages to act as lawmaker,
enforcer, and interpreter. Much more often, however, no single
body enjoys a monopoly over channeling behavior. A full or even
moderate treatment of the resulting strategic issues is obviously
not possible here, but because mistake of law is generally a creature of the judiciary, we briefly explore judicial incentives and constraints. If legislative preferences are as we described, why would
courts lend a hand? And assuming courts act to promote legislative
preferences, what role can they play?
A. Judges' Incentives
To the extent judges are the lawmakers, they will want compliance
with their rules. It is true that unlike legislators, judges (especially
life-tenured judges) do not directly answer to coalitions trying to
embody their preferences or private interests into law. Yet judges
presumably select their profession because they want to impose
39
In terms of Figure 1, not knowing ex ante whether they will end up at node 3
or 4, individuals may choose not to act. Mistake of law allows some people to move
from node 7 to node 3 once they know that a mistake that lands them in node 4 will
be excused.
40 For examples in a low sanction environment, see United States v Bishop, 412
US 346 (1973) (mistake of law is a defense to misdemeanor tax evasion prosecution

as much as to a felony prosecution); Lambert v California,355 US 225 (1957) (due

process violation to convict defendant for failing to register as required by municipal misdemeanor ordinance in the absence of proof that felon had opportunity to
know the law; sentence had been $250 fine and probation). For an example in a high
sanction environment, see United States v Frade, 709 F2d 1387 (11th Cir 1983)

(mistake of law is defense to Trading With The Enemy Act, which carries sanctions
of up to ten years in prison).
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their own normative beliefs on others. Most could have much
higher incomes in private practice; the difference is made up by
something else: part leisure, part prestige, and significantly, influence over the law. Judges become judges for the same reason individuals form coalitions: to influence people.4
Of course, when an individual judge is confronted with a defendant who seeks excuse because he did not learn the law, that judge
will rarely himself be the author of the law. That judge may have
no more desire to encourage compliance with disagreeable common law then he does to encourage compliance with disagreeable
statutes. Nonetheless, the mutually reinforcing effect of stare decisis may help keep judges' behavior sufficiently incentive compatible so that treating the judiciary as a single entity often makes
sense.4 2 And because the federal judiciary is monitored by a single
decision-making entity, the Supreme Court, agency problems
among individual judges are further minimized. Thus, if excusing
ignorance reduces compliance with the law, one would expect
judges to be quite chary of excusing ignorance of judge-made law.
Yet today criminal law is statutory. Judge-made substantive
contributions still abound-an important one for our purposes is
constitutional limits on statutes. But since criminal law is
largely an attempt by legislators (or bureaucrats) to channel conduct, can courts be expected to strengthen legislative mandates?
If judges' normative preferences diverge from legislative outcomes,43 and if judges are inclined to be activist,' statutory bargains will likely be weakened without structural or practical con4' For an exploration of judges' utility functions, see Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize?, 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev 1 (1992).
42 For an analysis of stare decisis as an imperfect solution to nonproductive
strategic judicial behavior, see Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 736
(1993).
' Often the criminal prohibition enacted by the legislature will accord with the
normative preferences of the judge. Although a half-century of expansion in federal
criminal law has engulfed so much conduct that criminal law does not always
reflect widely shared beliefs about appropriate behavior, much of Title 18 of the
United States Code as enforced channels behavior in relatively uncontroversial
ways. At least two recent symposia have focused on the controversy over the federalization of criminal law. See Symposium-Federalism and the Criminal Justice
System, 98 W Va L Rev 757 (1996); Symposium-Federalizationof Crime: The Roles
of the Federal and State Government in the CriminalJustice System, 46 Hastings
L J 965 (1995).
" Many judges view their role as non-activist. A judge can propagate his or her
views about law in many ways, and being a good agent of the legislature is to some
the most defensible way. After all, vigorous enforcement of problematic law may be
an effective way to expose its shortcomings.
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straints on judicial behavior. Some such constraints surely exist
on the federal courts. For example, the Supreme Court Justices,
as the ultimate judicial interpreters of congressional statutes, are
subject to extensive screening in the appointment process. As
long as a majority on the Court remain non-activist, the value of
legislative bargains is enhanced.45 Moreover, even if activist
judges wish to thwart particular legislation through a restrictive
interpretation or invalidation, they may find it difficult to succeed. If the coalitions that formed to enact legislation are stable
(and absent exogenous shifts they usually will be), then interest
group transfers are unlikely to disappear with judicial invalidation of particular legislation. If the group seeking legislation was
part of a majority coalition for legislators, then the legislators
presumably benefit by continuing to regulate on the group's
behalf. As a result, the legislation may simply return in a new,
more complex, more expensive, and hence more inefficient form,
as the New Deal Court found. This is not to say that judges have
no power to impede legislation, merely that the exercise of that
power will often be limited.
Consequently, judicial incentives may be largely compatible
with the legislature's goals. Whether they are is a complex empirical question that may never be answered. But mistake of law is one
area where the interaction between courts and legislatures can be
observed. If the courts are acting as good agents of the legislature,
then they can be expected to use criminal law doctrines, including
mistake of law, in a way that maximizes the value to the interest
group of the legislation itself. Mistake of law can help avoid wasteful sanctions, and avoid using judges' time in ways not likely to
impact behavior. The doctrine must be sharply confined, however,
to prevent watering down the channeling effect of the law itself. As
we detail in Part V, this is what we observe the courts doing. To the
extent criminal law is a legislative engine for pulling people in a
certain substantive direction, judges rarely seem to be stopping the
train, at least with mistake of law doctrine, and often they assist
the conductor.
" Landes and Posner focus on the role of an independent judiciary in enforcing
legislative bargains struck by the enacting Congress rather than serving the preferences of the present Congress. William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875 (1975). How-

ever, they never answer the question of why the judiciary serves any Congress at the
expense of the judges' own normative preferences. Perhaps the judiciary's interme-

diate level of independence ensures general fidelity to congressional preference,
while encouraging a focus on the originating Congress.
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B. The Role of Judges as Good Legislative Agents
1. Administering "reasonableness"
We predicted that legislatures would prefer, at the most, to excuse
only those who acted while reasonably mistaken as to the law. As
with any legal rule, the application will be uncertain no matter
how precisely defined, and reasonableness tests are notoriously
imprecise. To the extent the imperfect administration of a reasonable mistake of law excuse will induce some to remain ignorant
who otherwise would have learned and complied, deterrence will
be reduced. Every legal test carries error costs with it, but because
of its direct effect on compliance, one would expect the legislatures
to be wary of even a reasonable mistake of law defense. And even
if perfectly administered, some additional reduced compliance will
result inevitably as the probability of conviction, q, is reduced for
some. The same problems that exist with the pure mistake of law
defense exist here, only less so.
On the other side of the coin, each sanction is wasted if imposed
on a person for whom the prior probability is low enough and the
information cost is high enough such that no information will be
gathered. The courts, with greater hindsight than the legislature,
can more easily weigh these costs against the watering down effect
of allowing the excuse. One way to accomplish this is to conduct
the "reasonableness" calculation on a statute-by-statute basis,
sometimes as a matter of law, rather than for each person prosecuted under every statute. For each statute, a court can examine
the universe of activity prohibited, and determine if a defined
group of people can be expected to remain ignorant of the law. One
can then expect a reasonable mistake of law excuse if:
1. Many actors "reasonably" will not know the law when
they act (because p is low and c too high, given p, to
obtain more information); and
2. Those actors are easily separable from the actors for
whom not knowing the law is likely unreasonable
(because they have a high p or a low marginal c); and
3. The legislative bargain is one in which imposing sanctions on the ignorant and overchanneling behavior
potentially jeopardizes the bargain itself.
The first requirement reduces wasteful punishment and court
time. The second requirement helps ensure that compliance will
not be weakened. As to the second requirement, it could be that
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the group reasonably mistaken as to the law can be easily identified and distinguished by fact finders. Or it may be that the courts
find a way to distinguish the groups with a specific formulation of
mistake of law. But if neither can be successfully accomplished,
then the effectiveness of the prohibition itself is jeopardized.4 6 The
third requirement is where public choice comes in: it ensures that
the enacting coalition gains something for the small reduction in
compliance that a mistake defense entails.
Importantly, the fact that judges actually enhance the legislative
bargain by reducing deadweight costs does not mean that aiding the
bargain and maximizing social welfare amount to the same thing. If
the underlying criminal law prohibits behavior that is valuable, the
welfare-maximizing rule would be for the courts to let as many people go free as possible. Or at the least, for a court pursuing "efficiency", a dollar reduction in deadweight costs associated with
enforcing the statute would be worth a dollar reduction in compliance with the statute. Courts would set rules that equally trade off
such costs and gains. But a court enhancing the legislative bargain
would not make such a trade; reducing costs has only an indirect
effect on the legislative bargain- it matters only to the extent it
induces the groups who bear such costs to resist the underlying bargain. In contrast, reducing the deterrent effect of the law causes a
direct reduction in the value of the transfer itself. Thus, a court
enhancing the legislative bargain will not fully internalize deadweight costs, but will fully internalize reduced compliance: the
court will place a thumb on the scale in favor of compliance.
2. Subsidization of information costs: controlling the agencies
Sometimes the regulator can reduce the cost of information. Even
a legislature subject to popular will, however, cannot be expected
to fully internalize the costs borne by the populace of uncovering
the law. Elected officials serve the members of their majority coalitions, not the entire citizenry. To the extent regulation represents
a transfer from losing to winning coalitions, the gainers are even
better off if they can impose the information costs on the losers.
Other things equal, then, legislators prefer private markets in the
provision of legal information.
Private markets often fail to maximize compliance, however, for
the obvious reason that whenever equation (4) holds, the private
46 The actor separability noted here is different from the act separability discussed earlier. See Part III.B.1. If actors are easily separable, mistake of law is more
likely to excuse, whereas easily separable acts are less likely to warrant mistake
excuses, because the overchanneling problems are reduced.
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marginal cost exceeds the private marginal benefit to that information. Particularly when regulation is obscure yet generally applicable, the deterrent effect of the law is threatened without a public
subsidy of legal information.4" That subsidy could take many forms,
including press releases, posters and notices in areas where illegal
conduct occurs, or broadcast commercials. The legislators presumably prefer that public funds are expended to the point where the
marginal benefit of increased deterrence, above and beyond that
achieved in the private market for information, equals the marginal
cost to the legislator and his supporters of the public subsidy. In any
event, the public subsidy preferred by the legislature will not likely
be the socially optimal subsidy, whatever that may be.
What role can the courts play in reinforcing legislative subsidization preferences? Where the legislature as lawmaker delegates to
another entity the task of enforcing the law, agency problems may
result in less public subsidization than the legislature prefers. A legislature may desire full knowledge of its prohibitions (to maximize
behavioral influence), but an enforcement agency may not. The
enforcement agency gets paid for catching criminals, not deterring
them. To the extent the judiciary views its job as enforcing legislative
preferences, it may nudge the enforcement agency toward greater
subsidization of information costs in cases where much deterrence
could be accomplished at small cost.4 8 And as we shall see, it has.
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND LOWER
FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF MISTAKE
OF LAW: A STUDY OF DETERRENCE AND
INFORMATION COSTS
To recap our predictions, we expect courts to take a cautious,
highly limited approach to mistake of law. If the substantive law
is judge-made or if courts faithfully promote legislative goals, we
predict a mistake of law defense only when it can be applied to
those who reasonably mistake their obligations without eroding
the channelling effect of the substantive law itself. Recall also
"' Alternatively the government could increase awareness of the law by punishing the ignorant, and capitalizing on the resulting media coverage. See Livingston
Hall and Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U Chi L Rev 641, 648
(1941) ("A conviction for doing that which violates a new law, although not regarded
as wrong in the community, is a matter of considerable interest and does a great
deal to educate the community"); Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 1 Substantive CriminalLaw § 5.1, at 587 (West, 1986) ("LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law"). In Part VI we discuss political constraints on using this alternative.
48 Compare Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of the Government to Make
the Law
Known, 51 Fordham L Rev 255, 285 (1982).
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that "reasonableness" has a very stylized meaning for us: a mistake of law is reasonable only if the court expects that some identifiable and separable group has a low prior probability that the
conduct is illegal and a sufficiently high cost of gathering correct
legal information that they cannot be induced to know the law.
We think that the courts treat mistake of law as we predict. The
federal courts have some difficulty perfectly incorporating a reasonableness standard into mistake of law because the mistake defense is
largely a matter of statutory interpretation. The courts are thus constrained by the language of the statutes themselves. Many of those
statutes prohibit "knowing" or "willful" conduct, and the question
for the courts is whether the language applies to knowledge about the
legal requirements themselves. As an official statement of law, then,
the courts have a binary choice: either the prosecution must prove a
defendant knew about the law or it need not. In many cases, the
courts cannot explicitly use a reasonableness standard and simultaneously remain faithful to the language of the statute.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, those who should have
known the law go to jail. Before deciding that knowledge of the law
is an element of the offense, the federal courts seem to consider
whether the criteria examined above have been satisfied. If so, mistake of law becomes an excuse, and the courts often seem to rely on
juries to, in effect, incorporate a reasonableness standard into mistake of law. When the juries have managed to do so, the appellate
courts signal to the lower courts that challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence about the defendants' knowledge will be unsuccessful.
We divide our discussion of case law into three parts. Section A
explains why courts treat mistakes of fact and law differently. Section B discusses mistake of law as applied to judge-made substantive law, both common law and constitutional law. And section C
analyzes Supreme Court interpretation of mistake of statutory law.
A. Mistakes of Fact and Law Distinguished
In contrast to mistake of law, which is available only in extremely
limited circumstances and only where mistakes seem reasonable,
mistake of fact excuses criminal conduct as a rule rather than as an
exception. Mistake of fact, whether reasonable or not, is a broad
defense to criminal liability, both at common law and in the federal courts.4 9 Indeed, mistake of fact excuses were read into two fed49

See Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law ch 9 § 1, at 1028

(Foundation, 3d ed 1982) ("Perkins & Boyce, CriminalLaw"); Model Penal Code and
Commentaries § 2.04 (ALI1985) (mistake need not be reasonable if the crime or the
element of the crime involved requires that a person acted purposefully or know-

ingly).
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eral criminal statutes by the Supreme Court during the 1994
term. ° From a culpability standpoint this seems odd: unless the
crime is malum in se, how could one be more deserving of punishment if unaware of the illegality than if unaware of what he is
doing?5 1 Yet viewed from the lens of information costs and deterrence, the result makes sense.
From a regulator's perspective, the disadvantage of mistake of
law is that it reduces knowledge of the law and thus reduces compliance. A mistake of fact, in contrast, is much less likely to do so.
To illustrate, consider the facts of Staples v United States.5 2 Staples was convicted of possession of an unregistered machine gun.
His gun, originally a semi-automatic rifle (firing only one shot per
pull of the trigger), had been modified for fully automatic fire. Staples claimed he did not know the gun would fire automatically,
and it had never fired automatically when he used it. The Supreme
Court overturned his conviction, holding that the trial court
should have instructed the jury that Staples' mistake, if believed,
was grounds for acquittal.
Analyzed from an incentives perspective, the result is predictable. Staples himself aside, individuals have a strong interest in
accurately characterizing the type of guns they are using. To the
extent guns are used for hunting or safety, individuals presumably
rely on those characteristics before deciding how challenging a situation to enter. Moreover, the physical characteristics of a weapon
affect the price an individual is willing to pay for it and the care
taken in cleaning, loading and storing it. Given that denying or
limiting a mistake of fact defense is often extremely unlikely to
have more than scant marginal effect on individual awareness, the
50 Staples v United States, 114 S Ct 1793 (1994) (National Firearms Act prohibition of possession of unregistered machine gun requires government to prove defendant knew that weapon he possessed had characteristics that made it "machine
gun" as defined in statute); United States v X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S Ct 464
(1994) (Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act's prohibition of
knowingly transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing or reproducing a visual
depiction involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct
requires government to prove defendant knew the depiction was of a minor and that
he knew the minor was engaged in sexually explicit conduct). For a more limited
mistake of fact defense, see Posters N"Things, Ltd. v United States, 114 S Ct 1747
(1994).
51 See Laurence Houlgate, IgnorantiaJuris:A Plea for Justice, 78 Ethics 32 (1967)
(those ignorant of the law do not deserve punishment), Douglas Husak and Andrew
von Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of Law, in Stephen Shute, John Gardner and
Jeremy Homer, eds., Action and Value in Criminal Law 157 (Clarendon, 1993) (concluding that those reasonably mistaken as to the law should be excused entirely,
and those unreasonably mistaken should have their sanction reduced).
52 114 S Ct 1793 (1994).
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courts can economize on ex post sanction and court costs by excusing those who turn out to be mistaken.
The argument is of course more general than the facts of Staples.
Independent of the law, people internalize the consequences of not
knowing what they are doing. They already have an incentive to
make reasonable efforts to know the facts surrounding their conduct. In contrast, they do not normally internalize the consequences of ignorance of the law, unless the governing criminal law
rules force them to do so. In the mistake of law context, then, the
defense is limited to prevent underchanneling. Mistake of fact is
excused more liberally, to economize on sanctions and to prevent
overchanneling. Note that both these concerns become more acute
as the sanction grows. Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court
has noted a greater need for a mistake of fact excuse in high sanction contexts.5 3 In contrast, as we predict, concerns about high
sanctions apparently play little role in the Court's mistake of law
decisions.
This rationale for the distinction is buttressed by examining
some of the limited circumstances in which mistake of fact is
unavailableas a defense. For example, until recently the defendant
in statutory rape cases typically was not excused for mistaking the
age of the girl with whom he had sexual intercourse.5 4 In these
contexts, however, the defendant is presumably interested in the
intercourse, not the age of the girl. Denying the mistake defense
forces men to internalize the aspects of the conduct that are problematic to the regulators.5 5 And in other situations, people can
' See, for example, Staples, 114 S Ct at 1802-04 (1994) (citing several authorities); United States v X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S Ct 464, 469 (1994).
54 See People v Olsen, 685 P2d 52, 54 n 10 (Cal 1984) (en bane) (mistake of age
no defense to statutory rape in overwhelming majority of jurisdictions); State v
Davis, 229 A2d 842 (NH 1967); Eggleston v State, 241 A2d 433 (Md 1968); State v
Fuiks, 160 NW2d 418 (SD 1968).
55 In the statutory rape cases, even reasonable mistakes of fact sometimes go
unexcused. We think the explanation lies in regulator indifference to overchanneling. As Parker explains, one method for preventing overdeterrence in the criminal
context is to excuse mistakes of fact. Parker, Mens Rea (cited in note 14). However,
an alternative mechanism is to draft the statute to criminalize less conduct than the
regulators actually want to deter, so that the overcompliance with the terms of the
statute ends up more closely channeling behavior to the preferences of the regulators. As we show below, this technique may well be more common in areas where
the Supreme Court has attempted to limit the regulators' wording of statutes with
constitutional constraints. But it is true also of statutory rape: by criminalizing
intercourse with girls under the age of fourteen, many individuals will forgo intercourse with sixteen year old girls. To the regulators, this chilling effect may not be
overchanneling at all. In fact, in separate cases the California Supreme Court held
that while a mistake as to age does not excuse the crime of lewd and lascivious con-
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deliberately avoid learning some culpable facts without great peril
in an effort to avoid criminal liability. An example would be a
courier who is paid several hundred dollars to take a package across
town. The courier may suspect that he is carrying contraband, but
deliberately choose to remain ignorant of the facts to avoid possible imprisonment. In similar situations, courts
generally use a
56
"willful blindness" rule to deny the excuse.
Another exception is found in the context of mistake of jurisdictional facts. In United States v Yermian, s7 for example, Yermian
was convicted of making a false statement within the jurisdiction
of a federal agency. Yermian had supplied false information to his
employer in connection with a Department of Defense security
clearance. He admitted knowing his statements were false, but
denied knowing that his false statements would be transmitted to
a federal agency. The Supreme Court held that the government
need not prove Yermian knew of the jurisdictional fact. Although
technically mistake of fact, from the perspective of incentives to
uncover information, this case is much more like mistake of law:
there is no incentive to learn the particular facts unless the law
insists 5one
learns them. Hence, Yermian's ignorance was no
8
defense.
duct with a child under fourteen, People v Olsen, 685 P2d 52 (1984) (en banc), a reasonable mistake as to age is a defense to the crime of statutory rape of a minor
under age eighteen, People v Hernandez, 393 P2d 673 (1964).
Interestingly, in recent years more states have begun allowing mistake of fact
defenses to statutory rape. See Garnett v State, 632 A2d 797, 802-03 (Md 1993) (by
1993, 21 states permitted a mistake of age defense in some form). This change of
law may reflect changing views about the social costs of overchanneling behavior.
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 US 64
(1994)-a mistake of fact as to age of the actor in a sexually explicit video is a
defense-reflects similar changing assessments. In this First Amendment context,
the Supreme Court does care about overchanneling, because it views non-obscene
sexually explicit depictions of adults as potentially valuable speech.
56 See, for example, United States v Jewell, 532 F2d 697 (9th Cir 1976); United
States v Restrepo-Granda, 575 F2d 524 (5th Cir 1978). See also Barnes v United
States, 412 US 837, 845-46 (1973) (although evidence did not prove Barnes actually
knew he possessed stolen checks, it showed he must have known of the high probability the checks were stolen, which sufficed for conviction).
57 468 US 63 (1984). See also United States v Feola, 420 US 671 (1975) (defendant
need not know the individual he is assaulting is a federal officer because identity of
victim as federal officer serves merely to provide federal jurisdiction over crime).
s8 Interestingly, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether the government
need at least prove that defendant knew or should have known of the jurisdictional
fact. The jury had been instructed that such proof was required, but the government
did not object to the instruction. See Yermian, 468 US at 75 n 14. A reasonable mistake of fact defense is, of course, fully consistent with our approach.
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B. Mistake of Judge-Made Law
Returning to our analysis of mistake of law, we first treat mistakes
of substantive laws that have been fashioned by the judiciary. In
these cases, the judges find themselves in the position of both regulator and interpreter. Subsection 1 discusses mistakes as to the
common law and subsection 2 mistakes about the constitutionality of criminal laws.
1. Mistake of common law
Criminal law had its genesis in the common law, and it is there
that the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is easiest to
predict. The common law generally prohibited acts "mala in se",
those considered inherently evil. 9 Criminal law reflected widely
shared social norms about highly immoral behavior. In such a
context, an individual with a mistaken low prior belief in his act's
illegality would be relatively rare. And because the act violated
community moral standards, those people were on notice simply
by living in society, or could cheaply become aware, that their
conduct was not only immoral but also illegal. The person with a
credible argument both that he was mistaken as to the law, and
that the cost of correcting his mistake was prohibitive (high c),
was exceedingly rare. Further, because the judges themselves
developed criminal law, surely they had an interest in ensuring
maximum compliance with their normative views as expressed in
the law.
Moreover, where individuals could be easily separated, based on
their peculiar characteristics, from the rest of the population,
courts could use other means to excuse their behavior. For example, those who by reason of insanity could not appreciate that their
60
conduct was wrongful have generally not been held accountable.
Similarly, young children have been exonerated from the criminal
laws.6 1 In both these contexts, individuals have characteristics that
reliably separate them from others, prior probabilities are low and
costs of information are prohibitively high.
Interestingly, the common law developed an exception to the
mistake of law maxim that also fits well with our predictions.
59 LaFave & Scott, 1 Substantive CriminalLaw § 5.1, at 587-88 (cited in note 47);
Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea at 644 (cited in note 47).
60 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.01 (ALI 1985); Perkins & Boyce,
CriminalLaw ch 8 § 2 at 950-95 (cited in note 49).
61 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.10 (ALI 1985); Perkins & Boyce,
CriminalLaw ch 8 § 1 at 936-50 (cited in note 49).
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Where the mistake entailed a misunderstanding of a body of
common law other than the criminal law itself, the actor was
sometimes excused from criminal liability.62 A classic example is
Regina v Smith.63 Smith had rented an apartment and, during the
lease term, he installed roofing, wall panels and floor boards. On
vacating the apartment, his brother damaged these items in an
attempt to remove some electric wiring Smith had installed for
use with his stereo equipment. Smith was convicted under the
Criminal Damage Act of 1971, which provided criminal penalties
for any "person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages
any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage
any such property." 64 Under landlord-tenant law, permanent fixtures become the property of the landlord. Thus, Smith committed the offense, even though the trial judge apparently conceded
that it was quite natural for Smith to have concluded that the
property he damaged was his own. The court of appeal overturned his conviction, finding that an honest though mistaken
belief that the property was his own constituted a defense to the
charge against him.
Smith was mistaken about a law developed by the courts, so
why does the court allow his mistake to be an excuse? Here, the
mistake of law defense is much less likely to water down compliance with the criminal law. A tenant will not initially know and
likely not learn the intricate details of landlord-tenant law. A tenant would normally think that given his investment, the floor
boards and wall panels belong to him. Consequently, the prior
probability for tenants may well be sufficiently low so that they
might reasonably mistake the law. If so, allowing the mistake of
law defense will not likely reduce compliance, especially given
that the tenant remains civilly liable to the landlord for damages.
To save the opportunity costs of court time wasted on cases
that
65
fail to channel behavior, mistakes here become an excuse.
62 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.04(1) at 267-69 (ALI 1985)
(where material element of offense incorporates, by reference, some legal characterization, defendant not guilty unless he was aware of a substantial probability of that
characterization). See also State v Sawyer, 110 A 461 (Conn 1920); State v Cude, 383
P2d 399 (Utah 1963).

63 1 QB 355 (1973).
64 Id at 358.
6 Ignorance of non-penal laws tends to excuse only when, as in Regina v Smith,

the costs of ascertaining civil duties is high. Compare Jerome Hall, Ignorance and
Mistake in CriminalLaw, 33 Ind L J 1, 41 (1957) (maxim applies to all penal law and
"simple aspects of torts, family law and other non-penal laws which have obvious
moral significance").
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2. Mistake as to constitutional law
We predict that mistakes about the constitutionality of criminal
laws would rarely immunize actors from criminal liability. Because
constitutional law doctrines generally take the form of vague standards, one can almost always make an argument that a given law is
unconstitutional. Allowing individuals to rely on these arguments
to excuse liability could seriously water down the deterrent effect
of the criminal law generally. And as with the common law, the
courts use constitutional law to channel behavior. Here too the
courts have an interest in ensuring maximum compliance with
their dictates.
A further concern should make courts wary of fashioning a mistake of constitutional law defense. Stare decisis works to make
decisions about constitutional law path dependent.6 6 Each decision
has to be made against a backdrop of legal doctrine that is difficult
to alter or ignore. Hence, those who have a personal interest in the
development of constitutional law have an incentive to try to
manipulate the path of such developments by strategically timing
test cases that are brought before the courts. In an effort to minimize that manipulation, then, courts can be expected to force individuals to suffer the consequences of incorrectly construing constitutional protections by denying a mistake of law defense. The
denial helps to make it more likely that cases and their issues
develop
randomly rather than as a consequence of gaming by liti67
gants.

The analysis is not entirely straightforward, however. When conduct is close to the line, the specifics of constitutional law are
hardly easy to predict. Further, in many instances improving one's
guess is costly, requiring high-priced lawyer time. The consequences are overchanneling costs or wasteful sanction costs. As
discussed earlier, one way to help minimize those costs is to allow
a mistake of law defense. Then those who are aware they are near
the line of illegality but in fact are acting in ways deemed valuable
to the regulator will be more likely to act, knowing they are presumptively immune from having made a judgmental error. Thus, a
constitutional mistake of law defense may appear in some limited
circumstances where the Court feels secure that the defense will
66 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back From The Forest: Justiciabilityand
Social Choice, 83 Cal L Rev 1309, 1350- 67 (1995).
67 Of course, the judges themselves may be attempting to manipulate the docket

rather than permitting random law development. But either way, judges certainly
want to minimize litigants' abilities to achieve through manipulation the litigants'
substantive goals.
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not reduce compliance. To see how the various factors play out, we
examine four prominent Supreme Court cases treating mistakes
about the constitutional law in the criminal context.
In the first, United States v Murdock,6" Murdock had refused to
give requested information to the Internal Revenue Service, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He was
convicted of willfully refusing to supply information and took his
case to the Supreme Court, which held that because he feared prosecution under the state rather than federal tax laws, he had no constitutional right to refuse to answer.69 When the case was
remanded, however, Murdock insisted his conviction was improper
because his misunderstanding of his Fifth Amendment rights precluded a finding that his refusal to supply information was "willful", as required under the federal statute. The Supreme Court
agreed with him, holding that his misunderstanding of the law was
a defense to his charge.
In a much more recent case, Cheek v United States,7 0 Cheek
was convicted of willfully attempting to evade income taxes and
failing to file income tax returns. He appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court, claiming, in part, that he mistakenly believed that
the federal income tax on wages and salaries was not authorized by
the Sixteenth Amendment. Here the Supreme Court rejected mistake of constitutional law as a defense, stating "Cheek was free in
this very case to present his claims of invalidity and have them
adjudicated, but like defendants in criminal cases
7 in other contexts, . . . he must take the risk of being wrong." '
Both defendants in effect claimed that the application of the
criminal tax provisions, as applied to them, was unconstitutional.
Both turned out to be wrong. Why is Murdock excused by virtue of
his mistake but not Cheek? One explanation is that Cheek's claims
were frivolous. They had been universally rejected by the federal
courts, and Cheek, who had himself been involved in previous litigation challenging the constitutionality of the income tax, was
aware of the courts' lack of sympathy to his claim.7 2 In contrast,
the validity of Murdock's assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights
was very much unsettled until he brought his first appeal to the
Supreme Court. In the years preceding his assertion, the question
68 290 US 389 (1933).
69 United States vMurdock, 284 US 141

(1931). This holding did not survive the
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. Maloy v
Hogan, 378 US 1, 3 (1964).
70 498 US 192 (1991).
71 Id at 206.
72 Id at 194-96.
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of whether one could assert a Fifth Amendment right because of
probable incrimination under state law had been raised but not
decided in one case and specifically reserved in another. 73 Because
the law had been explicitly left unsettled in the recent past, the
Court concluded that Murdock's assertion of his rights was not "so
as to exhibit bad faith and establish
unreasonable and ill founded
4
willful wrongdoing."
Moreover, Murdock found himself in a problematic situation
driven by the Internal Revenue Service. He had to make a choice
between answering and risking state prosecution or asserting his
Fifth Amendment rights and risking federal prosecution. Unlike
Cheek, who admitted he was attempting to bring a test case
through the federal courts,' s Murdock's refusal to answer had no
strategic agenda component. And, once questioned by the IRS,
Murdock had no choice but to risk criminal prosecution one way
or the other. Cheek, however, faced noncriminal alternatives. As
noted by the Court, he was free to pay his taxes, file for a refund,
and, when denied, file a claim in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the income tax.7 6 The procedures set up in the tax
arena allow individuals to test their constitutional beliefs without
threatening the deterrent effect of the tax laws themselves. Consequently, the Court had no need to weaken overall compliance with
a mistake of constitutional law defense.
Two other Supreme Court cases, Hamling v United States7 ' and
Screws v United States,7 8 turn on overchanneling costs. Hamling
involved convictions under a federal statute prohibiting the knowing use of the mails for mailing or delivering obscene materials.
The definition of obscenit because it implicates First Amendment freedoms, has been left to the courts as a matter of constitutional law. Hamling and others had been involved in the compilation and printing of a book, The Illustrated PresidentialReport of
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.They had taken
the presidential report, added photographs of the sexual activities
described in the report, and put together a brochure that advertised
the book for sale. The brochure contained, almost exclusively,
73 See Ballman v Fagin, 200 US 186, 195 (1906) (issue involved but not decided);
Vajtauer v Commr. of Immigration,273 US 103, 113 (1927) (specifically reserved).
74 Murdock, 290 US at 396. A later Supreme Court characterization of Murdock
confirms that "[alt the time [Murdock invoked the Fifth Amendment] the law upon
the point was uncertain" and that Murdock's position was therefore "reasonable."
Browder v United States, 312 US 335, 341 (1941).
75 498 US at 204-05 n 9.
76 Id at 206.
77 418 US 87 (1974).
7"325 US 91 (1945).

HeinOnline -- 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 252 1996-1997

Richard S. Murphy and Erin A. O'Hara

253

selected photographs from the book, and was mailed to individuals
in several regions of the country. A jury deemed the brochure
obscene using the prevailing Supreme Court test, and the defendants appealed their conviction, claiming that they believed the
brochure was not obscene under Supreme Court doctrine. To support their claim, defendants offered three pieces of evidence: similar materials were sold at newsstands throughout the country; a
magazine featuring similar materials had received second-class
mailing privileges; and similar materials had been found nonobscene by the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court held that
the government need not prove Hamling was aware the brochure
was obscene, within the meaning of Supreme Court doctrine.
The Court showed concern about underchaneling in Hamling,
admonishing that "[t]he evils that Congress sought to remedy
would continue and increase in volume if the belief of the accused
as to what was obscene, lewd, and lascivious was recognized as the
test for determining whether the statute has been violated."79 But
what about overchanneling-why is the Court not concerned about
chilling valuable speech, especially given that the standard for
obscenity is vague and difficult to ascertain ex ante?
In fact, the Court's overchanneling concerns have already been
incorporated into the constitutional treatment of obscenity.
Because Congress regulates as close to the constitutional line as
possible, first amendment doctrine is intentionally over-protective
to avoid chilling potentially high "value" speech. The Supreme
Court (or Congress) perhaps does not care about deterring indecent
speech. But if it sets the constitutional rule allowing indecent
speech to be banned, the information costs associated with determining what is "indecent" will create overchanneling, effectively
inducing some to refrain from speech that may be, say, half-decent.
So the court broadens the defense, narrowing the prohibition to
only "obscene" speech. Mistakes as to the definition of "obscenity" may deter some indecent speech, but the court no longer cares
much. Having already solved the overchanneling "problem", the
Court has little need for a mistake of law defense. The strong presumption against any weakening of compliance is not overcome.
Screws presents a fascinating contrast. The facts were highly
charged: a Sheriff, Screws, beat a black man to death while the man
was in his custody. Screws was prosecuted under a federal statute
that provided:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected,
79 418 US at 120-21 (quoting Rosen v United States, 161 US 29, 4142 (1896)).
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any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States,...
shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both."0
Screws challenged the validity of the statute for failing to give
notice of punishable acts. The legal issue was a broad one, because
by its terms, the statute punishes any violations of constitutional
rights committed under color of law.
Unlike the obscenity issue in Haniling, the Court cannot be
confident that all the constitutional standards implicated in this
statute fully incorporate overchanneling concerns. Constitutional
rights cover broad territory and take many forms, and at times the
rights delineated are intended to channel the behavior of government employees who have a strong incentive to act as close to the
constitutional line as possible. Those officers are paid to be aware
of their constitutional responsibilities and to uphold constitutional
values, but to go no further than necessary so that the peace and
security of the population as a whole can be maximized. A prominent example is the Fourth Amendment: presumably the police
have a powerful incentive to search and seize as much as they can,
and if they go over the line, the exclusionary rule does not hold
them personally responsible. In such a context the Court may be
less concerned with overchanneling when it sets the constitutional
standard; it will attempt to precisely influence behavior.
The addition of the criminal statute, however, changes the calculus. Overchanneling of police behavior becomes a real risk. True,
on-the-job training and the presence of legal staff significantly
lower the costs of ascertaining constitutional rights already fashioned by the Court. But future developments can never be perfectly
forecasted by government employees; new constitutional rules,
specific as they may ultimately be, are crafted from hopelessly
vague standards, such as "due process" and "probable cause". The
cost of "correctly" applying vague standards to some official conduct becomes infinite. Faced with the inevitable tension between
vigorous enforcement of popular laws and criminal sanctions for
mistaking the permissibility of official actions not yet constitutionally tested, many individuals might quite rationally stay out of
the fray entirely.
The Court prefers to channel behavior precisely, yet it values the
added deterrent effect provided by the criminal statute. The solution, advocated by a plurality of four Justices, was to limit the
80 Screws, 325 US at 93.
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statute's application to previously articulated constitutional mandates."' The federal statute proscribed only "willful" conduct, and
the plurality proposed using the language to cure the statute of
potential vagueness problems by limiting prosecutions to actors
who were given fair warning that their conduct fell within constitutional prohibitions. In effect, "willfulness" would narrow the
application of the statute: "the specific intent required by the Act
is an intent to deprive a person of a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or by decisions interpreting them." 2 So construed,
the plurality encourages maximum investment in learning and following its mandates, yet tempers overchanneling by shielding individuals who could not have known constitutional requirements.
And as a bonus, wasteful sanctions are minimized.
The general approach of the plurality in Screws fits well with
our predictions, but it has not yet been explicitly embraced by a
majority of the Court, nor have specific details of the approach
been addressed. The Court has just83granted certiorari to consider
these issues in the 1996-1997 term.
C. Statutory Law: Cautiously Excusing Some Reasonable
Mistakes
Congress rarely explicitly writes mistake of law defenses into individual criminal statutes. And for much of their history, the federal
courts did not interpret federal statutes as excusing mistakes of
law. Their treatment closely tracked the common law rule in state
courts, and for similar reasons: mistake of law threatens investment in legal information and provides an excuse to circumvent
the criminal laws. Even where poorly drafted statutes were admittedly ambiguous, mistaken interpretations were rarely excused. As
noted by the Supreme Court, the common law rule:

81 A fifth Justice, Justice Rutledge, appears to have implicitly ratified the

approach, by stating, "[wihen, as here, a state official abuses his place consciously or
grossly in abnegation of its rightful obligation, and thereby tramples underfoot the
established constitutional rights of men or citizens, his conviction should stand
325 US at 131 (emphasis added).
Id at 104.
83 United States v Lanier, 116 S Ct 2522 (1996). In Lanier, two questions are presented: first, does Screws prohibit defendant from being convicted under the statute
unless the right violated was previously made specific by Supreme Court decisions
in factually similar circumstances?; and second, has the due process right to be free
from sexual assault by a state official acting under color of law been made specific
....

2

"

within the meaning of Screws?
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results from the extreme difficulty of ascertaining what is,
bona fide, the interpretation of the party; and the extreme
danger of allowing such excuses to be set up for illegal acts, to
the detriment of the public. There is scarcely any law, which
does not admit of some ingenious doubt; and there would be
perpetual temptations to violations of the laws,
84 if men were
not put upon extreme vigilance to avoid them.
As the regulatory state expanded, however, with many more
criminal acts "mala prohibita", the Court's treatment of mistake of
law began a mild transformation. As the scope of federal criminal
law encroached upon everyday behavior, many criminal defendants
quite understandably complained that they didn't know their acts
were criminal. Moreover, as the complexity of federal regulatory
programs grew, it became increasingly costly for some individuals
to find out that their acts were proscribed. In our terminology, p
was low and c relatively high: without excusing some mistakes of
law, then, sanctions would be imposed wastefully. And wasteful
sanctions threaten to erode the durability of the transfers themselves. To remedy the problem, mistake of law cases over time
increasingly took on the language of negligence. At times, the
Court decided as a matter of law whether some individuals might
reasonably be ignorant of the law in question. If not, mistake of
law provided no excuse to criminal charges. If so, the Court was
more likely to allow a mistake of law defense, especially where
people who would not investigate their legal duties without the
excuse could be easily segregated from those who might. In the latter situation, the Court's rule, as incorporated by the lower federal
courts, resembles a de facto negligence standard.
To provide relevant background, we discuss the Supreme Court's
treatment of "public welfare" cases in subsection 1. We then discuss three areas where mistake of law has become an excuse: in
subsection 2, broadly applicable complex prohibitions such as
criminal tax evasion; in subsection 3, laws that could be cheaply
publicized by the regulator; and in subsection 4, the Supreme
Court's most recent treatment of mistake of law, Ratzlaf v United
States.
1. Where mistakes are rarely reasonable: "public welfare" cases
Because it is important to emphasize how the Supreme Court has
remained cautious with respect to mistake of law, we begin with a
84

Barlow v United States, 32 US 404, 411 (1833).
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line of cases rejecting the excuse. In each of these cases, the regulated group is homogeneous and relatively sophisticated. Moreover,
these individuals are generally in the business regulated; for them,
the cost of ascertaining their legal duties is low for each regulated
transaction. And by classifying these cases as "public welfare"
cases, the Supreme Court implicitly recognizes that Congress was
much more concerned about underchanneling than overchannelling.
We discuss three mistake cases that fit this pattern, all of which
reject the defense. In United States v International Minerals &
Chemical Corp. the defendant was charged with shipping sulfuric
acid in interstate commerce and "knowingly fail[ing] to show on
the shipping papers the required classification of said property, to
wit, Corrosive Liquid, in violation of 49 C.F.R. 173.427." Ss The
defendant asserted it was unaware of this picayune criminal regulation, but the Supreme Court held that such awareness need not
be proved by the prosecution:
[W]here, as here. . . dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he
them must be preis in possession of them or dealing 8with
6
sumed to be aware of the regulation.
In other words, it is not reasonable for the shipper to not learn
the law. Those in the industry will have a low c, because they are
repeat players. Even the dissent agreed with this point, asserting
that "triers of fact would have no difficulty whatever in inferring
87
knowledge on the part of those whose business it is to know."
The dissent did express concern about the "casual shipper, who
might be any man, woman, or child in the Nation... who had
never heard of the regulation."8 8 But of course this is the point: the
majority believed such a casual shipper would be exceedingly rare.
Since almost all prosecutions will involve a member of regulated
industry with a low c, the majority is unwilling to water down the
deterrent effect of the sanction merely because of the rare individual who is justifiably unaware of a regulation when shipping sulfuric acid.
Similar arguments appear in two hybrid mistake of law and fact
cases. In United States v Freed,89 Freed was convicted of receiving
85 402 US 558, 559 (1971).
86 Id at 565.

87 Id at 569.
88 Id at 569.
89 401 US 601 (1971).
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a hand grenade that was not registered to him as required by the
National Firearms Act. Although Justice Douglas' opinion is hardly
a model of clarity on precisely what Freed alleged he did not know,
the ultimate holding of the Court was that the prosecution need
not prove knowledge of the weapon's unregistered status. As Justice Brennan emphasized in concurrence, the regulated devices
were "major weapons" such that "the likelihood of governmental
regulation of the distribution of such weapons is so great that anyone must be presumed to be aware of it."9" This comment smacks
of de jure negligence: any mistakes would be unreasonable. And,
he might have added, to the extent the absence of a mistake
defense overdeters trade in hand grenades, Congress probably does
not care nearly as much as it does about preventing too little registration.
The legislative preference for avoiding underchanneling was the
explicit rationale in United States v Balint.9 1 Balint sold opium
and coca leaves without using a "written order on a form issued...
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue," a requirement of the
Narcotic Act of 1914.92 The Court had little patience with Balint's
assertion that he lacked the requisite knowledge, emphasizing that
the Act's "manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in
drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes
within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited
drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him. Congress
weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a
penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger
from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided."9 3

90 Id at 616.
91 258 US 250 (1922).
92

Id at 251.

254. As in Freed, the Balint opinion does not clarify whether the mistake
was one of fact or law. But in this context, we would predict that even a mistake of
fact might not exonerate. The cost of information is sufficiently low to the targeted
sellers, and underchanneling sufficiently worrisome, that any marginal weakening
931d at

of the statute is not tolerated. The same result occurs in a line of Supreme Court
cases watering down scienter requirements for "public welfare" offenses, usually
involving dangers to the populace. See, for example, United States v Dotterweich,
320 US 277 (1943) (misbranded drugs). Watering down scienter all the way to strict
liability (that is, refusing to allow even a reasonable mistake of fact), as Dotterweich seemed to, is more surprising under our model, however. Even the Balint court
limited itself to whether the statute required "the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells." Balint, 258 US
at 253 (emphasis added).

HeinOnline -- 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 258 1996-1997

Richard S. Murphy and Erin A. O'Hara

259

2. Permitting reasonable mistakes: taxes and food stamps
Over time, congressional regulations became more complex, and
complex regulations, bolstered by criminal sanctions, became more
likely to govern the affairs of the average citizen. Take, for example, tax laws and food stamp regulations. Both of these regulatory
structures are complex in order to channel behavior precisely, yet
both touch on the behavior of very large portions of the population
as a whole, rather than being limited in scope to particular industries. Priors about the details of these laws are relatively disperse,
depending on the individual background of those affected. And
given both the complexity of the laws and the lack of expertise by
many regulated in these areas, the costs of ascertaining legal duties
is often high. In short, many people may quite reasonably remain
ignorant of relevant legal details.
Criminal Tax Provisions. The federal tax code is designed to
both raise revenues and channel conduct toward more desirable
activities. Federal regulators, most notably Congress and the Internal Revenue Service, desire maximum compliance with the tax
provisions. Those who fail to comply with the tax laws face possible civil actions and criminal prosecutions. At the same time, however, concerns about overchanneling remain significant, for two
reasons. First, while Congress prefers to maximize compliance
with revenue raising and wealth transfer measures, tax rules that
unnecessarily reduce overall social wealth hardly maximize reelection prospects. Second, the complexity of the tax codes makes it
difficult to separate taxable and non-taxable income or deductions.
Indeed, in determining whether monies are taxable as income, the
Supreme Court has admitted that case by case analysis is often
essential: "Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." 94 The second factor exacerbates the first: given that overchanneling is costly in the tax area, the problem becomes more
acute with the relative inseparability of acceptable and unacceptable conduct.
To minimize overchanneling and wasteful sanctions imposed
on those undeterrable because of low p and high c, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the criminal tax provisions to include a
mistake of law excuse. The code punishes "willful" violations of
the tax provisions, 95 and the Court has held that willfulness in this

94 Welch v Helvering, 290 US 111, 115 (1933); Commissioner v Duberstein,363
US 278, 288 n 9 (1960).
95 See 26 USC §§ 7201-7207 (1994).
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context
entails a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
96
duty."
However, even unreasonable mistakes of federal tax law excuse
criminal liability, for two reasons. 97 First, the Court cannot
remain faithful to the "willful" language by incorporating a reasonableness standard into the criminal tax provisions. Either willfulness includes knowledge of the law or it does not; a reasonableness standard envisions an entirely different mens rea and
cannot fairly be crafted out of thin air. Second, unlike many other
areas of the criminal law, individuals have incentives to learn the
tax laws for reasons other than a desire to avoid criminal prosecution. Greater knowledge of the tax laws may be equally likely
to uncover possible deductions and exemptions, which serve to
lower tax liabilities. Mistake of law here may thus resemble mistake of fact, where unreasonable mistakes are excused because
adequate care likely results for other reasons. 98 Moreover, the tax
codes provide for civil liability in addition to criminal sanctions,
and individuals may be moved to investigate the tax laws in order
to avoid audits and civil penalties. If these factors fail to spur
investigation into the relevant legal details, denying a mistake of
law defense is not likely to either, and litigating over "reasonableness" is not worth its costs.
Still, despite the Cheek Court's pronouncement, it never dismissed reasonableness as a practical matter. Instead, the Court
noted, "[ojf course, the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or
misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them
to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government
has carried its burden of proving knowledge."9 9 And in fact, as a
matter of enforcement policy and jury convictions, those who
96 United States v Bishop, 412 US 346, 360 (1973). Accord United States v Mur-

dock, 290 US 389, 396 (1933) ("Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of
a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a
return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct.");
United States v Pomponio, 429 US 10, 12 (1976) (per curiam); Cheek v United
States, 498 US 192, 200-01 (1991).

9"Cheek v United States, 498 US 192 (1991) (rejecting Seventh Circuit's requirement that defendant's belief or misunderstanding of the tax laws be objectively reasonable). Interestingly, while Cheek's conviction was overturned by the Supreme
Court, Cheek was re-convicted under the Court's standard, and given a sentence
even greater than he received upon his first conviction. United States v Cheek, 3
F3d 1057 (7th Cir 1993).
98 See Part V.A.
99 498 US at 203-04.
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should have known their tax obligations are convicted. Since' the
Court's pronouncement, the Internal Revenue Service has focused
audit efforts disproportionately on lawyers and accountants." 0 And
most criminal convictions that are upheld involve 1) individuals
who concealed their income; 2) tax protestors;1l0 or 3) attorneys
and sophisticated business people.' Defendants in the third category are often denied appeals based on sufficiency of the evidence;
to the courts of appeals, their backgrounds create a near presumption that they knew the law.0 3 In fact, whenever a federal statute
is interpreted to require that a defendant knew his legal obligations, "a jury may infer knowledge
of the law from a defendant's
04
education and experience.'

In contrast, in the rare cases where convicted defendants reasonably did not know their tax obligations, the courts of appeals
do not hesitate to overturn the convictions. One example is
05
United States v Harris.1
Harris and her twin sister each had sexual relationships with a wealthy widower who had died by the
time they were tried for willful tax evasion. The relationships
spanned several years during which time the man gave each a
total of over half a million dollars in money and jewelry. The
Government claimed that the money and jewelry constituted pay100 See Crackdown Begins On Lawyers Who Fail to File Taxes, Wall Street Journal B3 (Aug 19, 1994); IRS Is PursuingLawyers, Accountants for Back Taxes, Washington Post Al (Aug 7, 1993); N. Y Lawyers Said to Be Tax Probe Targets, Washington Post A7 (Aug 9, 1993).
101 See, for example, United States v Cheek, 3 F3d 1057 (7th Cir 1993); United
States v Sloan, 939 F2d 499 (7th Cir 1991); United States v Beall, 970 F2d 343 (7th
Cir 1992).
10' See, for example, United States v Owen, 15 F3d 1528 (10th Cir 1994) (Kansas
state senator, former lieutenant governor, president of multiple companies, and former banker); United States v Conaway, 11 F3d 40 (5th Cir 1993) (lawyer); United
States v McGill, 964 F2d 222 (3d Cir 1992) (lawyer); United States v Fletcher,928
F2d 495 (2d Cir 1991) (non-practicing attorney with accounting background); United
States v Townsend, 31 F3d 262, 267 (5th Cir 1994) (defendant "was no proverbial
babe in the woods").
103 Fact finders may consider the general educational background and expertise
of the defendant as bearing on the defendant's willfulness. See United States v
Fletcher, 928 F2d 495, 501-02 (2d Cir 1991) (non-practicing attorney with accounting background); United States v Rischard, 471 F2d 105, 108 (8th Cir 1973) (attorney with business and bookkeeping experience); United States v Goichman, 407 F
Supp 980, 987 (ED Pa 1976) (attorney).
104 United States v Simon, 85 F3d 906 (2d Cir 1996) (stockbroker convicted of
illegal structuring of transactions); see also United States v Retos, 25 F3d 1220 (3d
Cir 1994) (while ignorance of law excuses structuring conviction, jury could infer
defendant's knowledge that structuring is illegal from fact he was managing partner
of law firm).
105 942 F2d 1125 (7th Cir 1991).
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ment for sexual services and was therefore income taxable to the
sisters. The sisters claimed that they were gifts, and presented letters from the man stating that he enjoyed giving the sisters things
as tokens of his affection. To a majority of the panel, the fact that
the tax treatment of payments to mistresses had never been settled by any federal court other than the tax court, 10 6 and that the
tax court cases seemed to support the sisters, precluded their
criminal convictions:
If defendants in a tax case . . . could not have ascertained the
legal standards applicable to their conduct, criminal proceedings may not be used to define and punish an alleged failure
to conform to those standards. . . . In the tax area, 'willful'
wrongdoing means the voluntary, intentional violation of a
known-and therefore knowable-legal duty. . . . If the
obligation to pay a tax is sufficiently in doubt, willfulness is
impossible as a matter
of law, and the defendant's actual
10 7
intent is irrelevant.

The Harris case is thus, in a sense, reminiscent of the Screws
case discussed earlier. In both, the costs of ascertaining the legal
standard could be infinitely high.' 0 8 And in both, noncriminal
means exist for setting standards of conduct. Indeed, the Harris
majority warned that while the government was free to use the
courts to forge the treatment of payments to mistresses as income,
"new points of tax law may not be the basis of criminal convic1 09
tions."
106 The reason for this inherent ambiguity is that "[tihe motivations of the parties in such cases will always be mixed. The relationship would not be long term
were it not for some respect or affection. Yet, it may be equally clear that the relationship would not continue were it not for financial support or payments." Id at

1132.

107 Id at 1131-32 (citations omitted). In United States v MacKenzie, the Second
Circuit expressed similar sentiments:
the requirement of willfulness in the criminal tax laws has a bearing on an
analysis of vagueness. . . . 'On no construction can the statutory provisions
here involved become a trap for those who act in good faith. A mind intent
upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence.'
777 F2d 811, 816 (2d Cir 1985) (quoting United States v Ragen, 314 US 513, 524
(1942), and citing United States v Bishop, 412 US 346, 360-61 (1973)).
18 The Harris majority stated: "Before she met Kritzik, Harris starred as a sorceress in an action/adventure film. She would have had to be a real life sorceress to
predict her tax obligations under the current state of the law." 942 F2d at 1135.
109 942 F2d at 1131. The concurring judge disagreed with the majority's sweeping
analysis, arguing instead that the facts presented to the jury were insufficient to
prove that the man intended the money and jewelry to be payment for services
rather than expressions of affection or charitable impulse. Id at 1137.

HeinOnline -- 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 262 1996-1997

Richard S. Murphy and Erin A. O'Hara

263

In sum, while not perfect, the federal courts have come surprisingly close to incorporating a reasonable mistake of law defense into
the criminal tax laws. While possible exclusions from liability and
civil sanctions and audits may not motivate everyone to investigate
the tax laws, those who by reason of their background should have
known the law are often held accountable despite their claims of
ignorance. True, the jury is not instructed on reasonableness, so the
best the courts of appeals can do is uphold convictions where it
appears the defendant's claimed ignorance was unreasonable. However, given statutory constraints, the courts have come as close as
possible.
Food Stamp Violations. The tax evasion cases paved the way for
mistake of law regarding food stamp violations. In Liparota v
United States,110 the defendant had been convicted of unlawfully
acquiring and possessing food stamps under a federal statute that
provided criminal sanctions for "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters or possesses coupons or authorization cards in
any manner not authorized by" the statute or regulations.'' Under
the statute and regulations, retail food stores could accept food
stamps, but restaurants were not permitted to accept food stamps
as payment for meals unless specifically authorized by the Department of Agriculture. 112 Liparota was a co-owner of a sandwich shop
that had not obtained the required authorization to accept food
stamps. Nevertheless, he had purchased food stamps in the back
room of the restaurant from an undercover government agent on
several occasions for substantially less than the face value of the
stamps. Liparota appealed his conviction, arguing that the district
court should have instructed the jury that, as a prerequisite to
guilt, he must have known his purchases were unlawful. The
Supreme Court overturned his conviction, holding that the "knowingly" language of the statute was properly interpreted to require
actual knowledge of the law transgressed.
This regulatory regime touched on the lives of many who might
not reasonably be expected to learn the complex regulations. On
the one hand, "[glrocers are participants in the food stamp program
who have had the benefit of an extensive informational campaign
concerning the authorized use and handling of food stamps." 1 3 On
the other hand, individual recipients and third party non-participants in the program "may well have had no opportunity to
10

471 US 419 (1985).

..Id at 420.
12

Id at 421.

113Id at 430.
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14
acquaint themselves with the rules governing food stamps.""
Given the breadth as well as detail of the regulations, the Court
decided that "to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.""' In effect,
the Court was concerned about the wide dispersion of prior probabilities regarding the lawfulness of conduct, which depends in large
part on the extent of the individuals' involvement in the program.
And for those only tangentially involved in the food stamp program, the cost of learning the detailed regulations is prohibitively
high, given the high likelihood that some illegal conduct will
appear to them to be perfectly acceptable.
But how does the Court separate these individuals from the grocers who do not reasonably remain ignorant of the law? And how
does it separate "apparently innocent" conduct from violations
that individuals should be aware might be illegal? As with the tax
statutes, the Court is constrained to interpret the statutory mens
rea as either applying to knowledge of the law or not. And given
the broad criminal provision, the Court cannot isolate some conduct as requiring knowledge of the law but not others. As in the
tax area, however, the Court signaled to lower courts that evidence
indicating the defendant should have known his conduct was
unlawful suffices for a conviction:

In this case, for instance, the Government introduced evidence that petitioner bought food stamps at a substantial discount from face value and that he conducted part of the transaction in a back room of his restaurant to avoid the presence
of the other patrons. Moreover, the Government asserts that
food stamps themselves are stamped "nontransferable." . . .
A jury could have inferred from this evidence that petitioner
knew that his acquisition and possession of the stamps were
unauthorized." 6
Here too, while not perfect, the Court comes as close as feasible to
incorporating a reasonable mistake of law excuse into the criminal
1 17

statute.
114 Id.

1s Id at 426.
16

I at 434 n 17.

Separability of actors also helps explain contrary holdings in the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits regarding mistake of law in interstate wagering. In Cohen v United
States, 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir 1967), the court held that a federal statute prohibiting
117

"knowing" use of interstate telephone services for transmitting wagers and wager-

ing information allowed a mistake of law defense. Given that gambling is legal in
Nevada, some individuals might have no reason to believe their acts were culpable.
The court placed the burden of proof regarding knowledge on the defendant, in an
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3. Cases requiring information subsidies
The tax and food stamp laws are highly complex and detailed, and
the tax laws rife with ambiguities regarding liabilities. In those settings, everyone is aware that his conduct is regulated, so individuals likely assess a positive but low probability that specific aspects
of that conduct are unlawful. However, the costs of gathering information, given the complexity of the regulations, is often too high
to justify further investments. In contrast, this section considers
cases where many individuals are never even put on notice that
some aspect of their conduct is regulated at all. If people assess a
prior probability of zero on the unlawfulness of conduct, they cannot reasonably be expected to invest anything in knowing the law,
and therefore remain reasonably ignorant of even simple rules. If
the government could cheaply inform those individuals of the governing laws, compliance could be greatly enhanced. Unlike most
criminal law statutes where mistake of law reduces overchanneling
at the potential expense of reducing compliance, in this context,
mistake of law actually enhances compliance, by inducing the
enforcement agency to promulgate information. In short, both
Congress and the federal courts sometimes use mistake of law to
insist that enforcement agencies aid in furthering legislative bargains.' 18 This technique is an extension of the general requirement
placed on states that promulgated laws must be made reasonably
available to the citizenry." 9
Federal cases encouraging information subsidies all stem from
Lambert v California.2 ° Lambert involved a city of Los Angeles
felon registration ordinance which required that anyone convicted
of a crime punishable as a felony in California must register with
effort to separate occasional or social bettors from others. According to the court,
"the professional gambler will find it difficult to go forward with evidence of ignorance of the law pertaining directly to his business and even more difficult to prevail on that issue with the fact finder." Id at 757. Faced with the same issue, the
Tenth Circuit rejected Cohen's holding that the statute requires the defendant to be
aware of the prohibition. United States v Blair, 54 F3d 639 (10th Cir 1995). Because
gambling is generally illegal in all of the states in the Tenth Circuit, the court could
not identify a group with significantly lower p or significantly higher c. Thus, the
court's rejection of the defense also fits well with our model.
118 Congress, for example, explicitly wrote an ignorance of the law defense into
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, and the Investment Company Act of 1940. 15 USC §§ 78ff, 79z-3, 80a-48
(1994).
..
9 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.04(3) (ALl 1985) (mistake of law
is a defense if statute defining offense not reasonably made available prior to conduct).
120 355 US 225 (1957).
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the city if in Los Angeles for more than five days in any thirty day
period. The Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that
the statute include a mistake of law defense. The statute punished
some individuals for mere presence in the city, without alerting
12 1
them that their presence could trigger criminal sanctions.
Because the Court was articulating constitutional constraints on
state statutes rather than conducting statutory interpretation on
federal ones, it was not limited to a binary choice about knowledge
of the law. Most interestingly, the Court reached out and adopted
what appears to be a negligence standard, stating that "[w]here a
person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no
proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process."' 2 2
Three dissenters, through Justice Frankfurter, took issue with
the majority's willingness to force a mistake of law excuse into
state statutes." Lambert was problematic because it opened the
door to even greater federal involvement in state criminal law,
something the Court has tried to back away from in recent years.
Consequently, as forecasted by Frankfurter, this constitutional constraint on state criminal statutes turned out "to be an isolated
deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on the
waters of the law. " 12 4 No other case has used the Due Process
Clause to insist on a mistake of law defense to state crimes.
Lambert's force remains, however, for federal crimes. In Lambert, the government could have provided information relatively
cheaply to those regulated. For example, if the state or local government informed California felons upon conviction of their duty
to register, and notified out-of-state felons of their duties by placing
signs in bus, train and police stations, it might be able to satisfy the
Lambert standard, which stops short of requiring actual knowledge. With relatively little effort, the government could prove that
it was sufficiently probable that a given felon was aware of his duty
to register, and could thereby avoid the due process problem.
Thus, several federal courts have used Lambert to read mistake of law into federal statutes, at times without supporting
121 Id at 229 ("circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking").
122 Id at 229-30 (emphasis added).
123 The Court had rejected a previous Due Process Clause challenge to a state
statute that punished individuals regardless of their reasonable lack of knowledge
that they were transgressing state law. See Shevlin-CarpenterCo. v Minnesota, 218
US 57, 70 (1910) ("such legislation may, in particular instances, be harsh, but we can
only say again what we have so often said, that this court cannot set aside legislation because it is harsh").
124 Lambert, 355 US at 232.
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statutory language, to induce a federal enforcement agency to
subsidize information costs. A good example is the currency
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Among other
things, the Act provides criminal penalties for "willfully" taking
more than $5000 worth of monetary instruments into or out of
the country without reporting to the government. 2 5 The courts
have interpreted the statute to require proof that a defendant
knew he had an obligation to report his act.126 In effect, federal
courts require government warnings to those entering and leaving the country.
In United States v San Juan,2 ' for example, the court overturned the conviction of a woman who had failed to declare bringing in over $75,000 in cash while entering the United States by bus
from Canada. The customs inspector never told her that she had a
duty to report the cash. Instead, he merely asked her whether she
had purchased or acquired any items while in Canada. Noting that
the Bank Secrecy Act requires the registration of an otherwise
innocent item on which a duty is not generally collected, the court
admonished that "in order to prove willfulness, the Government
should make some effort to bring the reporting requirements to the
traveler's attention." 128
Customs officials then made some effort by asking people coming into the country whether they were carrying more than $5000
cash with them. In two different cases, the Fifth Circuit found the
question alone, whether asked in person or on a form, inadequate
to warn incoming persons of the reporting requirements. 129 To the
court the question could lead people to conclude that having the
money was illegal. If so, efforts to conceal the money from the customs agents would therefore decrease rather than increase the
reporting that Congress desired. Clarifying information could be
provided at relatively low cost:
125 31 USC § 5316 (1994).
126 See, for example, United States v Dichne, 612 F2d 632 (2d Cir 1979); United
States v Schnaiderman, 568 F2d 1208 (5th Cir 1978); United States v Granda, 565
F2d 922 (5th Cir 1978).
127 545 F2d 314 (2d Cir 1976).
1, Id at 319. Based on the court's statement in San Juan, the government prominently displayed a number of large multicolored posters in the departure area of
New York's airports, telling passengers of the reporting requirements, and placed
announcements over the public address system for international flights. These measures contributed to the later conviction of Zeev Dichne for transporting monetary
instruments without reporting them. In part because the government had finally
taken its suggested measures, the Second Circuit upheld Dichne's conviction.
Diclme, 612 F2d 632.
129 Granda,565 F2d 922; Schnaiderman, 568 F2d 1208.
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It is interesting to consider how easily the government could
avoid a recurrence of this problem. The simplest solution
would be to add a sentence on the Customs Declaration Form
to the effect that if you are carrying greater than $5000 you
are required by law to fill out certain
forms. Such a sentence
1 30
would place all travelers on notice.
In a related context, the Second Circuit used government information provision to distinguish two defendants convicted of failing
to register as narcotics law violators on leaving or entering the
country. The statute contained no mens rea language, providing
simply that any convict or addict who failed to register was subject
to criminal penalties. In United States v Mancuso,13 1 the court
incorporated the Lambert standard into the statute to avoid due
process concerns. As a consequence, to obtain conviction, the government was required to prove either knowledge or a probability of
defendant's knowledge of his duty to register. The court explained
the reasoning behind adopting a Lambert standard:
The primary purpose of law, and the criminal law in particular, is to conform conduct to the norms expressed in that law.
When there is no knowledge of the law's provisions, and no
reasonable probability that knowledge might be obtained, no
useful end is served by prosecuting the 'violators.' Since they
could not know better,
we can hardly expect that they should
132
have been deterred.

Mancuso's conviction was overturned; although a few signs had
been placed in the airport warning narcotics violators of their duty
to register, none was placed in the departure area. The government
had not demonstrated a sufficiently high probability that narcotics
law violators were put on notice of the law. In this context, courts
are acting as good agents of the legislature, by attempting to
increase compliance. The courts view the agencies as insufficiently
motivated to deter:
we are presented with that rare instance in which overturning
a criminal conviction will in all probability lead to improved
enforcement of the underlying act. The hallmark of this case
is sloppiness on the part of those charged with responsibility
for enforcing the statute . . . [A] simple notice provided with

each passport application, or a printed form given to narcotics
130 Granda, 565 F2d at
131 420 F2d 556 (2d Cir
132 Id at 559.

926.
1970).
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violators on their conviction, warning them of the requirement to register, would provide both the notice and knowledge necessary to sustain a criminal conviction, and to ensure
that the aim of the statute would be fulfilled.'
In its opinion, the Mancuso court distinguished one of the Second Circuit's previous cases, United States v fuzwiak, 3 4 in which
the court had upheld a conviction under the same statute. Juzwiak
left the country as a seaman on a ship bound for Europe, and testified that he first learned of the registration requirement when he
tried to return to the United States. According to the Mancuso
court, the difference was that the government had made greater
efforts to notify seamen of the law. Notices of the registration
requirement had been posted at the place Juzwiak obtained his
employment, at conspicuous places on the ship he frequented
before leaving the country, and in the union hall he had visited several times. 3 ' In fuzwiak, the court found that the government's
efforts satisfied the "probability of such knowledge" requirement
of the Lambert case.136 In short, Juzwiak may have remained ignorant of his legal duties, but unlike Mancuso, his ignorance was not
reasonable.
Of course, there is a dynamic aspect to the reasonableness of a
person's ignorance. When a new regulation is first promulgated,
unless the press picks up the story for the front pages of the newspaper or the six-o'clock news, most people are unaware of it. Over
time, however, as the government and others disseminate information about the regulation, the reasonableness of ignorance may
well dissipate. Moreover, to the extent the social costs of regulation are already sunk, they are not likely to threaten the future
durability of the regulation.
One example of the differential treatment of ignorance over time
is the Cuban Embargo cases in the Eleventh Circuit. The first,
United States v Frade,137 involved two priests who made efforts to
rescue Cuban refugees during the Mariel boatlift. The priests chartered a boat and negotiated with the Cuban government to assist
the release and transport of Cuban relatives of several parishioners
of the priests' church. The priests were arrested on their return
voyage, and charged with violating the Trading With The Enemy
Act, and a regulation promulgated under the Act. The regulation
133

Id.

1

258 F2d 844 (2d Cir 1958).
Id at 847.

13136

Id.

137 709 1F2d 1387 (11th Cir 1983).
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prohibited providing services to Cuban nationals, as well as transporting any baggage or other property of Cuban nationals. The regulation was "quietly promulgated, unexpected, and unannounced"
after the priests began negotiations with Cuba, 3 8 and it prohibited
seemingly innocent conduct which had been expressly authorized
prior to the regulation. Citing Lambert, the court interpreted the
criminal provision punishing "willful" violations to require knowledge of the prohibitions, and held as a matter of law that the priests
did not know of the prohibitions. The priests had made significant
efforts to stay abreast of political and legal developments, and the
only evidence of government publication of the regulation was
through Coast Guard radio announcements which were being
jammed by the Cubans.
Contrast Fradewith United States v Macko, 3 9 decided a decade
later. Macko and others were involved in a scheme to ship cigarette
packaging supplies and machinery to Cuba to manufacture counterfeit Winston cigarettes, and were convicted of violating the
same two provisions the priests had been convicted under. Unlike
the priests, however, Macko's conviction was affirmed, in part
because the defendants actively hid the Cuban connection to their
transactions. Perhaps more important to the court, however, was
circumstantial evidence of Macko's knowledge, including the facts
that the defendants were in the business of international sales and
exports, by this point the Cuban embargo had been widely publicized, and the government frequently apprised exporters of the regulations. In the words of our model,
their mistake of law, even if
140
actual, was no longer reasonable.
4. Structuring cases: Ratzlaf and beyond
Prior to 1994, most of the case law conforms with our predictions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v United States,14 1 however, arguably broadens mistake of law beyond our model. In Ratziaf, the defendant incurred a gambling debt of $160,000 while
playing blackjack in Reno, Nevada. When he attempted to pay off
Id at 1391.
139 994 F2d 1526 (11th Cir 1993).
138

140 Another line of cases treats the criminal provision of the Export Control Act.
The Act requires a license before exporting items on the United States Munitions
List, which is updated by the President. As a prerequisite to conviction under the
statute, an exporter of arms must have known that his exportation without a
license was illegal. Compare United States v Golitschek, 808 F2d 195 (2d Cir 1986),
with United States v Murphy, 852 F2d 1 (lst Cir 1988), and United States v Durrani, 835 F2d 410 (2d Cir 1987).
141510 US 135 (1994).
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the debt in cash, the casino informed him that it must report to the
federal government all cash transactions greater than $10,000.142
Told that this was true of banks also, Ratzlaf decided to purchase a
series of cashiers checks from area banks, each in amounts less
than $10,000, and then paid off his debt with these checks.
Unfortunately for him, Ratzlaf was unaware that "structuring"
transactions to avoid the reporting requirements is also illegal." 4
He was convicted despite his claimed mistake, and the Supreme
Court faced the question: assuming the defendant knew of the
reporting requirements, must the prosecution also prove the defendant knew of the anti-structuring rules themselves?"' In a five to
four decision, the Court answered "yes", and Ratzlaf went free.
In an important respect, the result is surprising. Once one is
aware of the reporting regulations, the marginal cost of finding out
precisely what the statute says is low. The anti-structuring provisions are in the same place in the US Code as the reporting requirements, and presumably most violators are sophisticated repeat
players. Using this reasoning, prior to Ratzlaf the large majority of
circuits had rejected a mistake of law defense to a structuring
charge. Typical was the Second Circuit's opinion in United States
v Scanio:
[Defendant] was not prosecuted for having failed to comply
with an obscure reporting requirement; he was charged with
• . . evading what he knew to be the bank's legal duty to file
CTRs for all transactions exceeding $10,000. [He] demonstrated an awareness of the legal framework relative to currency transactions which, it is reasonable to conclude, should
have alerted him to the consequences of his conduct. 4 '
Admittedly, the absolute cost of learning the law is not the only
variable in the model. Rather, "reasonableness" is determined by
examining whether c is sufficiently high, given the prior probability estimate. A belief that p is low for some may have been driving
the majority opinion in Ratzlaf: Justice Ginsburg emphasized how
structuring to avoid legal prohibitions comes naturally and is even
expected in other areas of the law (such as tax law).' 4 6 So perhaps,
See 31 USC § 5313.
See 31 USC § 5324. This provision was not part of the original act of 1970,
but was added in 1986.
144 The prohibition against structuring inherently requires that the defendant
knew of the reporting requirements: the statute outlaws structuring "for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements." Id.
145 900 F2d 485, 490 (2d Cir 1990).
146 510 US at 146.
142

143
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at least for some, the failure to look up the law is not so unreasonable, even if it would be cheap in an absolute sense to do so.
Nonetheless, even if Justice Ginsburg's point is granted, the
problem remains of separating those few who could not be
expected to learn the law from those who could. An attempt at this
was made in United States v Aversa, an interesting pre-Ratzlaf circuit court opinion allowing a partial mistake of law excuse.14 7 The
Aversa court held, en banc, that the defendant must know or have
a reckless disregard for the illegality of structuring. As Judge Breyer
stated in concurrence:
One can imagine how a person frequently in contact with
these laws, such as a financial officer or drug-fund courier,
could be found to have been "reckless" in failing to learn relevant legal data. However, it is difficult to see how one could
convict an ordinary citizen on this basis, i.e., in the absence of
actual, subjective knowledge of the legal duty, for "recklessness" involves the conscious disregard of a substantial risk.'
Recklessness differs from reasonableness, but it serves a similar
purpose-separating those with high information costs relative to
their prior understanding from those with low relative information
costs.' 49 The Ratzlaf Court presumably expected that such a sepa-

ration could be conducted by juries on a case-by-case basis, and in
fact it has been. Many post-Ratzlaf decisions allow the jury to infer
actual knowledge from facts, such as experience and education,
50
that in truth only prove what the defendant should have known.'
Still, Ratzlaf is a somewhat incautious extension of mistake of
law doctrine. Structuring is unlike tax law, where potential uncertainty often creates a high information cost and where precise
channeling is important. It is unlike regulation of food stamps or
border-crossing disclosure rules, where large segments of the population will have low prior probabilities. And overchanneling may
be of little concern to Congress: the point of the anti-structuring
provision, silly though it may be, is presumably to catch those
guilty of other crimes. It will be rare for a non-criminal to exit the
banking system simply to avoid cash reporting requirements. Thus
984 F2d 493 (lst Cir 1993) (en banc).
Id at 503 (Breyer, concurring).
149 See Parker, Mens Rea (cited in note 14).
150 See United States v Simon 85 F3d 906, 910 (2d Cir 1996) ("a jury may infer
knowledge of the law from a defendant's education and expertise"; stockbroker convicted of illegal structuring of transactions); UnitedStates v Retos, 25 F3d 1220, 1231
(3d Cir 1994) (although structuring conviction reversed in light of Ratzlaf for failure
to instruct jury on ignorance of law excuse, jury could infer defendant's knowledge
that structuring is illegal from fact he was managing partner of law firm).
141

148
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it is perhaps not surprising that Congress5 1swiftly overruled Ratzlaf,
eliminating the mistake of law defense.
Given Congress' rejection of the holding, the general implications of Ratzlaf for federal mistake of law doctrine are unclear.
Relying on Ratzlaf, two circuit court cases have extended mistake
of law to other federal statutes: dealing in firearms without a
license,15 2 and causing election campaign treasurers to submit false
reports to the Federal Election Commission.15 These cases may be
idiosyncratic, however. In the firearms case, Congress signaled its
concern about overchanneling by enacting the Firearm Owners
Protection Act, heightening the mens rea requirements for conviction of firearms violations;'14 in the elections case, the prosecu55
tion's interpretation of the underlying statute was dubious.1
151 Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994. See House Conf Rep No 103-662,
USC Cong & Admin News, vol 5 at 2024, 103rd Congress, 2d Session (1994) (statute
amended "in order to correct the recent Supreme Court holding in Ratzlaf v United
States. . . This section restores the clear Congressional intent that a defendant
need only have the intent to evade the reporting requirement as the sufficient mens
rea for the offense").
1-5 United States v Obiechie, 38 F3d 309 (7th Cir 1994).
l'3 United States v Curran, 20 F3d 560 (3d Cir 1994).
s' In Obiechie, the defendant was charged with dealing in firearms without a
license, in violation of 18 USC §§ 922 and 924. He had purchased fifty Beretta semiautomatic pistols and admitted to undercover agents that he planned to take the
guns back to his home in Nigeria and sell them to public officials. The Seventh Circuit overturned his conviction, holding that "willfulness" in the statute required
knowledge that unlicensed dealing was illegal. While the court picked the most natural interpretation of the statute (especially given Ratzlal, it is hard to believe that
a person engaged in the business of dealing firearms in our regulatory state cannot
be expected to investigate whether he needs a license to do so. The probability is
high, and the cost of investigation relatively low in most cases. Yet the Court may
have correctly ascertained Congress' intent: the FOPA was presumably passed as a
compromise among the various gun lobbies in Congress, some of whom clearly
desired to mitigate the risks of overchanneling and overenforcement. See David T.
Hardy, The Firearms Owners' ProtectionAct: A Historical and Legal Perspective,
17 Cumb L Rev 585, 588 (1987) ("FOPA reflects not a simple, single legislative decision, but a complex series of compromises").
155 In Curran, the defendant had asked his employees to write checks to candidates for federal office. He then reimbursed the employees in cash, thus circumventing the limits on campaign contributions. Federal misdemeanor charges for
making contributions in someone else's name were unavailable because the statute
of limitations had expired. The prosecution instead charged him with the felony of
"causing" campaign treasurers to submit false reports to the FEC. 18 USC §§ 2(b)
and 1001. The false reports were the contributor lists submitted by the various campaign treasurers. Of course, Curran had nothing to do with the preparation of such
lists, so saying that he "willfully caused" the submission of a false report in the
absence of knowledge of the law is a stretch, to say the least. On the other hand,
Curran was a lawyer and frequent contributor to campaigns, implying that the cost
to him of knowing the law was low.
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VI.

THE ROLE OF COURTS

The information cost analysis of this paper clarifies what was an
otherwise opaque set of federal mistake of law cases. In this section, we take on a more ambitious task-that of wrapping in the
public choice discussion from Part IV-with the hope that the
understanding of the cases and the limited role of the federal courts
may be strengthened. Several law and economics scholars have
argued that the common law tends toward efficiency. 5 6 George
Priest has taken the argument even further: the dynamics of litigation will also force interpretation of statutes toward efficiency
regardless of judicial motivations.15 7 Constraints on the judicial
role can limit the courts' ability to promote efficiency, however,
and that is where the public choice story comes in.
By now it is commonly understood that not all government regulation enhances social welfare. Despite procedural constraints,
interest groups can use government regulation, including criminal
prohibitions, to transfer wealth to themselves at the expense of the
rest of the population. At times the regulation taxes the regulated;
at others, a government program inures to the benefit of the regulated. In either case, however, the regulation may be inefficient
from a social welfare perspective. Priest argues that litigation pressures rules toward efficiency because the deadweight costs of inefficient rules provide a greater incentive to litigate to reduce those
costs, and more frequent litigation makes it more likely that a rule
will be changed or modified. If Priest is correct, then unconstrained
courts would end up watering down inefficient regulation through
statutory interpretation. In criminal law, courts would expand
excuses and defenses to help restore efficiency.
Or, put another way, if courts "efficiently" enforce statutes, a
court would accept one dollar less compliance if it would save
more than one dollar in reduced social costs. Social costs include
those necessary to the legislative bargain as well as some unnecessary costs, including wasteful sanctions. Yet criminal mistake of
law is in fact much more limited. The courts focus on reducing
only unnecessary social costs, and actually step in to enhance legislative bargains, which may ultimately increase the social costs
that are inextricably tied to the bargain itself.
A good example is the distinction between the public welfare
cases and tax evasion. In the public welfare cases, Congress provided criminal penalties to encourage great care on the part of
156 See note 22.

157 Priest, The Common Law Process (cited in note 22).
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those who might otherwise pose a risk of death on the general public. Regulation attempting to reduce the risk of death from explosion, firearms, and dangerous drugs may enhance social welfare.
Because these regulations are not clearly narrow interest group bargains, the court risks no loss of compliance, however small, from
even a narrow mistake of law excuse. The general public presumably benefits from these regulations, so they may be less sensitive
to the deadweight costs of wasteful sanctions than they would be
for more narrow interest group bargains.
And to the extent these "public welfare" regulations are really
interest group bargains, they likely benefit the very group regulated. Take, for example, the regulations on shipping dangerous
substances involved in United States v InternationalMinerals.l"8
The regulations increase the costs to shipping, raising the costs to
substitutes for the shipping industry. Recall that the dissent was
concerned that the casual shipper might not know the details of
governing regulations. But if part of the purpose of the regulations
is to eliminate casual shippers in favor of the established shipping
industry, then mistake of law would erode that part of the bargain
that might induce the shipping industry to join with the safety
groups in promoting the regulation. While an identifiable subgroup
of those regulated might not reasonably be expected to know the
law, too bad for them: the information costs are the barrier to
entry, which is part of the bargain in the first place. Hence, no mistake of law excuse.
Contrast the public welfare cases with the tax code, which is
exceedingly complex precisely because it is rife with narrow
interest group bargains. However, the interest groups benefit
from the bargains only if the government is still able to collect
revenues from other sources, and can do so without imposing too
many costs on the taxpayer. Note that reducing deadweight costs
may be comparatively more important in the tax environment
because the taxpayers at large likely wield more political influence than, for example, potential casual shippers of goods.' 5 9 To
reduce the taxpayer's burden, mistake of law minimizes wasteful
sanctions and reduces the overchanneling costs to criminal liability. Civil sanctions, audits, and de facto reasonableness restrictions on mistake of law all help to maintain the revenue base. In
short, the courts used mistake of law precisely where interest
group bargains are most common, and in a way that enhances
402 US 558 (1971). See Part V.C.1.
159 In other words, Becker's influence function may be more elastic in the tax
environment. See Becker, Competition Among Pressure Groups (cited in note 13).
'58
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the durability and therefore the value of
rather than threatens
160
those bargains.
The public choice focus also helps explain why courts sometimes force the government to subsidize information costs. Perhaps
the easiest way to raise p for individuals is by convicting the ignorant, as a signal to others that they need to know and comply with
governing laws, no matter how obscure, complex, or seemingly
unpredictable. Often that is the course courts take. But when the
interest group bargain forged by the legislature is vulnerable to
repeal, exposing the average person to potential criminal liability
based on ignorance threatens to unravel the bargain. Or put
another way, the media attention given to the conviction will
likely increase p, but at the expense of ripening conditions for grass
roots or other efforts to change the law.
The courts' narrow focus also helps explain the differing treatment of mistake of law in the civil and criminal contexts. Mistake
of law plays a limited role in criminal law, but it never excuses
civil liability. A partial explanation turns on efficiency. In civil law,
liability is more carefully tailored to actual harm than is the criminal law, where sanctions are set to eradicate rather than price acts.
As a consequence, overdeterrence is less problematic in the civil
law, so mistake of law is less useful. This explanation is incomplete, however, for two reasons. First, civil law also poses overde16 1
terrence problems, as the law and economics literature attests.
Second, as we noted earlier, criminal sanctions may be effectively
limited, making eradication infeasible.
The public choice wrinkle provides an additional explanation,
v Smith, a case discussed earlier, helps illustrate the
and Regina
point.162 Smith involved a tenant prosecuted under a criminal damage statute for removing floor boards and wall paneling that he had
installed in a unit he rented. Under landlord-tenant law, the boards
had become the property of the landlord. Assume that the law represents an inefficient transfer of wealth from tenants to landlords.
(After all, it is not clear why a tenant loses property rights in a light
fixture that he put in his apartment to enhance his environment.)
If the law is enforced with criminal sanctions, then the transfer to
6

' Similar results obtain from an analysis of judicial treatment of discriminatory
taxes under the due process, equal protection, and takings clauses. William Dougan
and Erin O'Hara, A ContractarianTheory of ConstitutionalDiscriminatoryTaxation (George Mason University School of Law Working Paper Series, on file with the
authors).
161 See Calfee & Craswell, Deterrence (cited in note 11). See also note 11 generally.
162 Smith, 1 QB 355 (1973). See Part V.B.l.
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landlords is effective only if tenants' behavior is channeled. If not,
then the landlord gets nothing from the law. From the perspective
of the landlord, sanctions are wasted unless future tenants are
more effectively deterred.
Civil liability is different, however. If the tenant's behavior is
channeled, the landlord owns the fixtures. If not, he gets a money
judgment. Either way, a transfer is completed. From the perspective
of the interest group that benefits from the law, the sanction is not
"wasted" in the civil context. In this sense, ex post liability is a necessary part of the value of the transfer, so mistake of law is no excuse.
Perhaps ironically, the courts' narrow scope for enhancing efficiency actually increases overall social costs by making durable
interest group transfers more likely in the first place. If Priest is
correct, then we need an explanation for why courts are effectively
constrained in their efficiency-promoting role, especially where
constitutional provisions like the due process clause could be used
to circumvent inefficient statutes. Unfortunately, we cannot yet
satisfactorily answer the question.
VII. CONCLUSION
In one sense, this paper attempts a very traditional task: to explain
the cases. It turns out that, whatever they may say, federal courts
administer the federal criminal law by sometimes excusing those
reasonablymistaken as to law, as we have defined it. Almost all of
the cases can be explained by the interaction of a few variables: the
prior likelihood that people will believe the prohibited action is
legal; the marginal cost of learning the law given the prior probability; the degree to which overchanneling is of concern; and the
watering-down effect on compliance that a mistake defense may
have (that is, underchanneling). And as long as one keeps in mind
that this last factor can trump the other concerns-that is, legislatures (and hence courts) are reluctant to reduce compliance-the
cases fall rather nicely into our model.
In another sense, the doctrine provides an informal test for the
approach we take in the paper. On the most general level, the cases
provide strong support for the economic approach. It is clear from
the language and the holdings of the cases that courts are very
aware of information costs, and of underchanneling and overchanneling concerns. That is, the courts treat violators as rationally
responding to the probability of being sanctioned and the difficulty
of learning the law, and at times the Supreme Court has been quite
subtle in its analysis of the variables, as we saw with the four cases
on mistake of Constitutional law.
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The doctrine also supports our public choice predictions. The
cases are certainly consistent both with our assumption that legislatures seek to maximize compliance with their laws, and with our
assumption that courts will bolster, not fight, this legislative
desire, even if the result is "inefficient". The public choice perspective is richer than previous attempts to model mistake as minimizing the costs of legal information, as the Court's contrasting
approaches to tax and "public welfare" offenses shows. And the
cases are certainly inconsistent with any notion of first-order
social-wealth maximizing, whatever that may mean in criminal
law. If courts were maximizing social welfare, to the extent any
particular criminal prohibition was socially excessive in scope or
sanction, as some surely are, they would excuse as many offenders
as possible. Instead, they excuse only in contexts where the excuse
is necessary to limit the prohibition's costs (such as overchanneling), but will not significantly reduce compliance. In this way,
courts actually enhance the value of the legislative bargain by
reducing the legislation's costs to other coalition members or even
to opponents of the legislation. We do not satisfactorily resolve
why the courts would serve as agents of the legislature, although
we discussed some of the practical constraints upon the courts
doing anything else.
Finally, we offer a speculative thought on the consequences that
costly information has for the scope of criminal law. There is a
dynamic aspect to information about criminal law that we did not
explore in this paper other than incidentally. If a particular criminal prohibition is stable, over time the number of people who reasonably do not learn the details of that prohibition shrinks. Thus
we may see mistake of law for particular provisions actually contracting over time. On the other hand, as federal criminal law
expands, covering more and more conduct, the total information
costs of knowing whether any given act is legal grows. From a public choice perspective, this latter tendency may provide an inherent
brake on the scope of criminal law. At some point, the behavioral
effects of law are constrained by the information costs of knowing
what is illegal; hence, coalitions may seek avenues other than
criminal law to achieve their goals. And as the social welfare costs
to criminal prohibitions rise, public choice theories predict that
additional prohibitions will become less likely to maximize a legislator's probability of re-election. That saturation point has apparently not been reached in the United States; in principle, however,
one would expect a maximum level of criminalization.
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